

THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGY - IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE'S NORTH

Henrikki Heikka

POLSIS, University of Birmingham

Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP,
Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribblers of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachments of ideas.

- John Maynard Keynes

Without a theory, the facts are silent.

- F.A. Hayek

1 Introduction

A study about Russian grand strategy is certain to raise more than a few eyebrows among observers of Russian foreign policy. How can one possibly assume that in a country with constantly changing prime ministers and an economy on the verge of bankruptcy there could be a commonly accepted Grand Plan about anything? Moreover, the record of post-cold war Russian foreign policy is so full of reckless moves and unpredictable u-turns, that it seems rather far-fetched to suggest that there could be, even in theory, a common logic behind it. Judging by the steady flow of publications on the role of self-interested politicians, parties, business elites, and organizational and bureaucratic actors in the formation of Russian foreign policy, it does indeed seem that most scholars see Russia's external policy driven by the day-to-day power struggles of various groups within the Russian political elite rather than by a common national strategy.

In this report, I seek to question this conventional wisdom. My analysis begins with an introduction to the study of grand strategy, in which I try to correct some common misconceptions related to the topic, and show through empirical examples how grand strategies have shaped the security architecture of the Nordic-Baltic region during crucial moments of the 20th century. I then proceed with a historical review of Soviet/Russian strategic culture, which carves out a debate between two schools of thought: a Frunzean "hard-line" school, characterized by near-paranoid threat perceptions and a preference for offensive strategies at all levels of military doctrine; and a "realist" school, originating in the work of Alexander Svechin and characterized by an understanding of security dilemma theory. According to the analysis, the hard-line school dominated Soviet strategic culture from the early years of the Soviet Union until the Gorbachev years. The nature of the cold war security dilemma, I show, was largely defined by the Soviet doctrine of strategic (counter)offensive in the European theatre, which provided the rationale for the existence of the Warsaw Pact and necessitated the American military presence in Europe. The "realist" school of thought, I argue, revived in the 1980's as civilian analysts with direct access to Gorbachev began advocating different varieties of defensive grand strategies. Following this logic, I show how the end of the cold war can largely be explained by the change in Soviet grand strategy, which changed the nature of the East-West security dilemma by erasing the fear of Soviet offensive intentions in Central Europe.

The bulk of the study is devoted to analysing the way in which the Russian political elite has reacted to the end of the cold war and the continuing decline of Russia's position in the international system. Through an analysis of Russian doctrinal debates during the last ten years, I trace the continuing influence of the two schools of thought and the gradual emergence of a consensus about the main tenets of Russian grand strategy. This consensus, I argue, has been achieved during two rounds of debate, the first culminating in the ratification of the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine in 1993, the second ending with the ratification of the Russian National Security Concepts of 1997 and 2000, and the publication of the new Military Doctrine (still not ratified by the President by the time this report was written). According to my analysis, the main achievement of the first round of doctrines was the consolidation of the idea of Russia as the regional hegemon in the CIS/post-Soviet region. The second round of doctrines, I conclude, reflects a consensus about the logic of multipolarity and Russia's consequent need to balance against perceived American hegemonic ambitions.

I conclude the report by speculating on the possible consequences of the main components of contemporary Russian grand strategy - the strive for regional hegemony and the imperative of multipolar balancing - on Nordic-Baltic security.

2 Grand Strategy and Strategic Culture

Two reasons have contributed to the lack of interest (Russian) grand strategy. First and foremost, the kind of information required from foreign policy analysts is often related to narrowly defined questions about a state's relations to another state, institution or alliance, usually within a short timeframe. Policy researchers are seldom commissioned studies about how a state's elite perceives abstract structures such as the security dilemma, the offence-defence balance, or the polarity of the international system and how these perceptions are conditioned by historical experiences. Consequently, recurring patterns in such areas tend not to be analysed with much sophistication, even when their consequences present constant challenges to other states. A second, closely related problem is that the concept of "grand strategy" is often thought to imply a concrete geostrategic grand plan, reminiscent of cold war era simplifications of a Soviet "drive to the sea", "drive to the West", "drive to the Middle East oil fields" etc. Thus, it tends to go unnoticed that abstract arguments such as

“Russian foreign policy is based on expected utility maximization” or “Russian foreign policy is based on the respect of international norms” are undeniably arguments about Russian grand strategy.

Before discussing the practical relevance of grand strategies the central concepts and the method used in this study will be outlined. The theoretical approach used in the study draws mainly from the “strategic culture” paradigm, which was originally developed for analysing Soviet security policy.¹ The paradigm focuses on how elites and decision makers assess and interpret the main characteristics of the international system in which they operate and how these assessments influence their views about the use of military force. In other words, the paradigm is concerned with the perceptions, beliefs, ideas, and norms that guide national security elites in their task of setting strategic priorities for the hard core of the state’s foreign and security policy.²

In contrast to studies assuming individual rationality, the strategic culture approach presumes that individual interests are constructed in the context of temporarily and logically consistent patterns of perceptions about a country’s role in international politics and the use of military force to achieve political ends. These patterns, strategic culture theorists presume, are rooted in historically unique “early” or “formative” experiences of a state or its predecessor polity, and are influenced by philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive factors as the state and its elites develop through time.³ The strategic culture paradigm does not presume that strategic culture would be unchangeable or unrelated to changes in “objective” factors - such as the development of new military technologies or changes in economic growth rates among states - but rather that core strategic beliefs are so deeply embedded in political culture (and culture in general) that they tend to change slowly and to constrain the effects that changes in a state’s security environment have on the state’s security policy.⁴

Obviously, a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Soviet/Russian strategic culture is far beyond the scope of this report. What I have attempted to achieve in the following is a study of the main tenets of Soviet/Russian strategic thinking, with a temporal emphasis on the post-cold war period. Thus, the study is essentially about *change*, about how the Russian national security elite has reacted to the rapid shift in the international distribution of power that followed the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is, admittedly, a somewhat frustrating research puzzle, since it does not answer the concrete

question on “how has Russian strategic culture influenced Russian policy vis-à-vis this or that country”. However, as I will try to elaborate later on, the significance of grand strategies do not lie in their relation to individual policies, but in the way they construct security dilemmas even in the absence of concrete threatening deeds.

In principle, the main source material of the study consists of textual material documenting the worldview of a polity’s national security elite (key politicians, generals, senior foreign and defence ministry officials, academics, the business elite, newspaper editors etc.). Needless to say, the list of such people is long and the textual material produced by them even larger. In the following, my strategy for finding the most relevant and representative pieces of strategic discourse has been largely defined by two criteria: the presumed political clout of the speaker, and the relevance of the substance of the text. Thus, official doctrines, which claim to represent the officially accepted views of the Russian foreign policy elite, and which provide fairly detailed answers to main question of grand strategy, have been given special attention. The same applies to informal or semi-official doctrinal statements by influential think-tanks, such as the Council on Foreign and Defense policy and RAU-Corporation. Speeches, articles, and books of key politicians, which deal explicitly with the subject of grand strategy have also been analysed. Writings of key civil servants and well-known academics, which dwell deeper into the theoretical and conceptual basis of grand strategy, have been used to provide flesh around doctrinal statements.

3 Strategic Culture in Action

Understanding the significance of strategic culture is made rather complicated by the fact that in an anarchic space states interact based on presumptions about the grand strategies - not just the capabilities and observable deeds - of other actors. Thus, strategic cultures are interdependent in the sense that they include interpretations about the strategic preferences of other states, as well as theoretical assumptions about the likely outcomes of the interplay of multiple grand strategies. While studying the former element is the bread and butter of diplomats and other government employees, the latter implies analysing abstract theoretical constructs - such as the security dilemma or the polarity of the international system – which cannot be done without reference (whether implicit or explicit) to international relations theory. Since this report is not meant to be an introduction into the various theories seeking to make sense out of the different structural situations created by the interaction of strategic

cultures, the theme will be clarified through empirical examples with direct relevance for this report.⁵

3.1 Nordic-Baltic Security Dilemma and World War II

The Nordic-Baltic region has historically been one of the theatres where actors with conflicting grand strategies have clashed. For at least the last three centuries, the security problematique confronted by the countries in the Nordic-Baltic region has been linked to the pan-European or global security calculus. The permanent interests of two regional great powers, Russia/USSR and Germany/Prussia, as well as the shifting interests of "outside" powers, especially USA and Britain, have set the stage for the security structures in which the smaller actors in the region have had to pursue their interests.⁶

The pre-World War II period and the cold war era provide particularly instructive examples of the influence of strategic cultures on the security of the Nordic and Baltic states. In the former period, the security dilemma of the small states in the region was strongly affected by the clashing security interests of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, both driven by highly militarised and offensive strategic cultures. The latter era was characterized by a more one-sided offensive threat from the Soviet Union.

The basic dilemma faced by the small states in the Baltic Sea region during the pre-war era was the rising power of two major actors, the Soviet Union and Germany, both characterized by a feeling of insecurity, a militarised political culture, and imperialist ambitions. Germany's insecurity arose primarily from its geostrategic location - no natural borders and major powers on both sides - a feeling reinforced by the experience of World War I. Soviet insecurity, as will be described in more detail later on, was a combination of ideological paranoia and realistic fear of German grand strategy. Both Germany and the Soviet Union reacted to the situation by developing offensive military doctrines, which, instead of increasing the security of the two countries, sent their security dilemma spiraling to the verge of war.

While the massive clash of German and Soviet grand strategies was to take place on the planes of Eastern Europe, the Nordic-Baltic region played an important role in the strategic plans of both powers. For Germany, the region was a potential attack corridor to Russian

heartland (and vice versa) as well as the source and transport route of valuable metals needed for the coming war effort. For the Soviets, the region was above all a potential buffer against the aggressive intentions of Germany and other “imperialist” powers.

The most important national interest of all the small states in the region was to remain outside of the German-Soviet security dilemma. The main problem confronted by them was that neither Hitler nor Stalin believed in their ability to defend themselves alone or in common with each other. Stalin’s paranoia added an additional twist to the problem: Soviet ambassadors knew that their career and even their lives were at stake in producing reports in line with Stalin’s Frunzean worldview of the Soviet Union as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile imperialist powers. Consequently, Stalin and his generals received tailor-made reports, which confirmed their fears of growing German influence in the Nordic-Baltic region.⁷

Pre-war Soviet and German grand strategies thus created a particularly problematic situation for the small states in the Nordic-Baltic region: Soviet offensiveness placed them under threat, while all balancing efforts were interpreted in Moscow in the light of presumed German influence. The small states tried to solve the problem by balancing against Soviet power as non-offensively as possible while maintaining their military readiness. Political and military cooperation was stepped up between Finland, Sweden Norway and Denmark (so called “cooperation in neutrality”), extensive military cooperation between Finland and Estonia took place also, and intelligence cooperation between Finland, Estonia, and Latvia (shared also with Germany and Poland) began.⁸ The hard core of the strategy of the Nordic states was summarized in 1938 by Sweden’s foreign minister Rickard Sandler: “*Norden* must be wiped from the calculations of the great powers’ military headquarters.”⁹

In the end, the strategy failed: only Sweden managed to stay neutral during the war, and only Finland amongst all other small states in the region managed to stay unoccupied, the latter made possible by cooperation with Germany during the 1941-1944 Continuation War. The Baltic States chose acquisition instead of annihilation, and became part of the Soviet Union.

3.2 The Nordic Balance and the Cold War

The end result of World War II was a unique security arrangement, often referred to as the "Nordic balance" which again reflected the influence of grand strategies on security in the region. In short, the Nordic balance referred to the situation created by three factors "constantly operational during the post-war period": the absence of Nato bases and nuclear weapons in Denmark and Norway, Sweden's neutrality backed with a credible defence capability, and the "special Soviet restraints in dealing with Finland".¹⁰ While the Nordic balance concept gathered a lot of criticism during the cold war¹¹, it nevertheless highlights several important aspects of the security dilemma created by Soviet grand strategy, and provides a useful framework for analysing the change that took place in the security dilemma with the end of the cold war.¹² In the following, the basic geostrategic factors behind the Nordic balance will be outlined.

For the West, the geostrategic importance of the Nordic-Baltic region during the cold war was two-fold. On the one hand, the region was viewed in the West as a potential attack corridor to the Central Front, the main theatre of the cold war. On the other hand, the region, especially in the 1980's constituted a buffer between the transatlantic Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC's) and the bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet (and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Baltic Fleet). Had the Nordic countries fallen into Soviet hands, securing the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap from Soviet attack submarines and other vessels would have been significantly more costly.

From the Soviet perspective, in turn, the Nordic region constituted a buffer zone between Nato's Northern Flank and two vital centres of the Soviet empire: the Kola complex and the Leningrad area. The former was home to the Soviet Northern Fleet and a majority of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, the latter was the second largest population centre in the USSR and a major military-industrial centre. Of importance to the Soviets were also the air defences located in the Baltic littoral as well as the airstrips on the Barents (and Kara) Sea coast which would have provided the last refuelling posts for strategic bombers on their way to the United States.

Keeping in mind the constraints created by these strategic factors, it is not hard to understand why the Nordic countries found themselves in a common search for stability and continuity

during the cold war. Strategy goes a long way in explaining the fundamentally different roles that the Nordic countries would have had had the region been drawn into a major war: While the defence of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden would have been coordinated with Nato, the role of Finland would have been not only to fight the Soviets alone, but to do so while the major strategic targets in Finland were being destroyed by Nato's tactical nuclear weapons in order to deny Soviet access to them.

However, the cold war was not only a conflict between two military blocks in which the Nordic states tried to pursue a stabilizing role, but also a conflict between two political systems, of which the other subscribed to the same core values as Nordic societies and based its military doctrine and nuclear strategy on an understanding of the security dilemma, while the other block constituted a direct threat to Western values and was driven by an offensive strategic culture. The Nordic balance can be seen as a concerted effort by small democracies to balance against a totalitarian/authoritarian great power by relying on Nato as much as was possible without provoking a response from the enemy.¹³ More precisely, the balancing act was one in which Norway, Denmark, and Sweden voluntarily restricted their reliance on Nato so as not to motivate the Soviets to tighten their grip on Finland. Thus, while the Nordics differed in their security solutions, they were united by a common understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat and the dynamics it created for the region.¹⁴

The fundamental difference in comparison to the pre-World War II security dilemma was that Nato, unlike Nazi Germany, sought to deter and contain the Soviet Union, not to invade it. The summary of Soviet strategic culture provided in this report explains why it took 40 years until even the most enlightened part of the Soviet elite could comprehend this difference - and how the shadow of past still haunts Russian strategic thinkers.

4 Soviet Strategic Culture

If Soviet/Russian strategic culture is to have any analytical usefulness in the present era, it should have significant explanatory power over the cold war security dilemma. The intention in the following is not to contribute to the debate between traditionalists, revisionists, and post-revisionists concerning the origins of the cold war, but to try to briefly sketch an interpretation, in line with recent research, about the evolution of Soviet strategic culture and suggest how it could be used to explain changes in the Russian-Western security dilemma.

Until the Gorbachev era, Soviet foreign policy planners and military strategists had to operate in an authoritarian/totalitarian political culture, where the Party exercised strong ideological control over the formulation of grand strategy.¹⁵ Moreover, the Soviet leaders inherited an empire, which had been ruled for centuries through an authoritarian and militarist political culture. Yet, throughout the Soviet era, strategic thinking had to take into consideration also the geostrategic realities confronted by the empire. The Soviet Union, just like the Russian Empire, lacked clear natural boundaries and lagged behind the West in economic power and technological development. Just as czarist militarism was in part a response to external threats and Russia's exposed geostrategic position,¹⁶ so can Soviet military policy be partly explained by the structural constraints faced by Soviet leaders during different historical periods.¹⁷

These two contradicting factors resulted in a strategic culture characterized by a mixture of offensive messianism and cool realism. The contradiction was clearly reflected in the polarization of the Western debate on Soviet foreign and security policy, a debate made all the more unscientific by the political battles over allocation of budgetary resources in the West. Those stressing the offensive character of Soviet strategic thinking usually ended up advocating more hawkish policies towards the Soviet Union, while those stressing the constraints imposed by structural factors on the Soviet Union (and/or the Soviets' understanding of those factors) made more dovish policy recommendations.

Since the end of the cold war, a body of literature offering a more balanced view of Soviet strategic culture has begun to emerge. This literature has generated new insights into the interaction of strategic and political culture, and questioned some of the premises on which cold war debates over Soviet foreign policies were conducted in the West. One major contribution of recent research is to provide a more accurate picture of the way battles over the *meaning* of strategic concepts - such as "defensiveness" - were tied to the evolution of domestic institutional and structural constraints faced by Soviet strategic planners. Another, closely related, contribution is tracing the existence of a really existing defensive *realpolitik* tradition (as opposed to offensive messianism), from czarist times through the Soviet era up to recent times, which surfaced in strategic discourse when the domestic situation and international environment permitted it to. What these contributions suggest is that in order to understand the extent to which the messianic tradition in Soviet strategic culture interfered

with realistic structural adjustments to external changes, one has to look at the domestic political battles fought in the Soviet Union over the main concepts of grand strategy.

4.1 The Soviet Cult of the Offensive: the Pre-Nuclear Era

The first, and perhaps most decisive, debate over Soviet grand strategy took place already during the first years of Soviet rule when Red Army strategic planners had to define the threats to Soviet security, the nature of the future war, and confronted the problem of correlation between offence and defence in military strategy, tactics and operational art. The mainstream interpretation, presented most forcefully by Mikhail Frunze¹⁸ (other prominent advocates of the view were Ioakim I. Vatsetis, chief of Red Army 1918-1919, and A.M. Zaionchovsky, a former czarist general), saw the Soviet-Western security dilemma through the prism of Marxist theory.¹⁹ According to them, the Soviet Union was the first broken link in the chain of imperialism - a chain that would soon break everywhere. Until that happened, the argument went, the Soviet motherland was like a “besieged fortress”, surrounded by a sea of hostile imperialism ready to “rush in to attempt to sweep away all the achievements of the proletarian revolution”.²⁰

Frunze believed that the contradictions of capitalism could only be solved by force “in a bloody battle between class enemies” and that “the very development of the historic revolutionary process will force the working class to take the offensive against capitalism when favourable conditions arise”. Thus, Frunze argued, “the requirements of the art of war and general policy completely concur”.²¹ While Frunze considered the political means for fighting capitalism as being “defensive” in nature, he argued that military strategy should be “decisive and offensive”. Defence, according to Frunze, was harmful and should be considered only a transitory phase for readying conditions for the offensive, or a geographically confined tactic for making possible strategic offensives elsewhere.²²

The opposing stance, articulated Alexander A. Svechin²³ and - somewhat more ambiguously - by Leon Trotsky (others included A.I. Verkhovski, a military historian and former minister, and - with some reservations - A. A. Neznamov, a professor and military theorist, formerly general in the czarist army), reflected a deeper understanding of the security dilemma. They opposed the idea that future wars would necessarily be class-based and revolutionary in character, and advocated a more defensive *realpolitik* strategy based on economic and

geographical analysis. Svechin especially remained sceptical of offensive strategies, arguing that they were often based on overestimation of one's own capabilities and wishful thinking about the appearance of "fifth columns" within the opposing country. In his view, the decision between offensive and defensive strategies should be based on calculations about capabilities and the expected utility of each strategy.²⁴

The fate of Soviet grand strategy before World War II was largely decided in the power struggle between Trotsky and his opponents, most notably Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.²⁵ The well-known result of the power struggle led to the discrediting of Trotsky and his views, with Frunze succeeding Trotsky as People's Commissioner for Military and Naval Affairs in 1925. While Frunze died soon after, his idea of a "unified military doctrine", which in essence made military doctrine identical to grand strategy, and military strategy subordinate to class struggle, was adopted as the official definition of military doctrine.²⁶

The major strategic innovation of the pre-World War II period in Soviet strategic thinking was the concept of "deep operations", which was to have a central role in Soviet strategy from there on. "Deep operations" (and "deep battle") referred to highly mobile and manoeuvrable offensive operations, which would reach behind the enemy's lines of defence.²⁷ The concept had its origin in Soviet studies about World War I, which pointed out the problems related to positional (trench) warfare and defensive doctrines.²⁸ Besides military theorists, the concept was supported by Stalin, who believed strongly that the enemy should be defeated on its own territory. By 1930, war preparations and strategic plans had been revised to facilitate deep operations. Tanks, aircraft and artillery began rolling off production lines, and Soviet officers started preparing more detailed operational concepts to fit the concept.²⁹ Also Soviet threat perceptions became more elaborate during the late 1930's. With Hitler's coming to power in Germany, capitalist imperialism had got a face.³⁰ By the eve of World War II, Stalin had divided capitalist countries into two categories: aggressive fascist states and "non-aggressive democratic states" (such as the United States, Great Britain, and France), the latter representing potential allies for the Soviets.³¹

If anything, the Second World War and Hitler's operation Barbarossa should have told the Soviets the virtues of strategic defence. After all, Soviet attempts to conduct deep operations had been a disaster, and the only major victories of the war, such as the battles of Kursk or Stalingrad, had been achieved when the Soviets were forced to take the defensive.

However, Stalin's post-war control of all aspects of Soviet life suppressed critical studies of the "Great Patriotic War", and constructed an interpretation of the war as a deliberate and successful counteroffensive against the Fascists.³² As the praise for Stalin's "creative genius" reached comical proportions³³, the real problems of offensive military strategy, especially its political dimensions, were left largely - though not totally - unstudied. In practice, strategic defence remained to be considered only as a temporary option, soon to be followed by a massive counteroffensive on all fronts. The only major change in grand strategy during the immediate post-war years was that with the defeat of Nazi Germany, U.S. and British imperialism was named as the most probable threat to Soviet security.³⁴

4.2 The Soviet Cult of the Offensive: the Nuclear Era

Stalin's death and Khrushchev's rise to power marked another decisive moment in the development of Soviet strategic culture. Both the military-political and military-technical side of military doctrine changed in order to adapt to the realities of the nuclear age.³⁵ On the political side, the doctrine acknowledged that war against the imperialists was no longer inevitable, since it would lead to mutual destruction. The military-technical side of the doctrine was based on the premise that the prime delivery vehicles of nuclear explosives would be missiles.³⁶ Nuclear war was, however, not ruled out all together, and Soviet strategists continued to debate the meaning of the nuclear revolution.³⁷ The outcome was a synthesis between nuclear deterrence and offensive grand strategy, with a clear emphasis on the latter. Initially, emphasis was laid on nuclear pre-emption and achieving nuclear superiority, and later on the promise of ballistic missile defences.³⁸ According to a standard Soviet textbook, offensive nuclear strikes were perceived as a useful way to destroy the enemy's nuclear arsenal, while a rapid deep strike with conventional forces would finish off the job by destroying the enemy's remaining conventional forces.³⁹ Thus, the core of Soviet grand strategy survived the nuclear revolution: the enemy was perceived as aggressive, and nuclear weapons were incorporated into an offensive war-fighting strategy.

In 1966-1967, under Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet grand strategy took a sharp turn, this time stressing the importance of nuclear war prevention, while acknowledging the possibility that a major war against the imperialists might stay under the nuclear threshold. The turn was reflected also in Soviet military exercises, which began to be based on the same premise. The factors underlying the change were obvious: achieving nuclear superiority had proven

impossible for the Soviets, as had the development of reliable anti-ballistic missile systems.⁴⁰ Relying on conventional superiority in the European theatre thus seemed like an attractive option. Achieving and maintaining parity in the sphere of strategic nuclear weapons would be enough, since developing conventional and theatre nuclear forces would enable the Soviets to achieve victory in a conflict in Europe while denying NATO the possibility of escalation (except at the strategic level). In effect, this was as offensive a strategy as the Red Army could realistically implement taking into consideration the size and quality of the American nuclear deterrent.

Throughout the 1970's, the situation stayed essentially stable with the Soviets seeking to maintain nuclear parity at the strategic level and conventional superiority at the tactical level. While rhetoric about nuclear war prevention proliferated in official speeches, strategic thinking and military procurement continued to emphasize the strengthening of Soviet military capabilities in order to repel imperialist aggression when needed.⁴¹ Moreover, the combat role of nuclear weapons continued to be emphasized and war plans took seriously the possibility of offensive use of nuclear weapons in par with conventional and tactical deep operations. Global power projection was set as the task of the Soviet navy, which in the 1970 *Okean* (Ocean) exercise demonstrated its capability to operate simultaneously in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. The threat perception throughout the decade was a mirror image of Soviet strategy: the imperialists were perceived as willing and able to launch a nuclear first strike at any moment with possible combinations of conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Satisfaction with nuclear parity instead of nuclear superiority reflected an externally imposed necessity rather than an acceptance of Western ideas of nuclear deterrence. The only real change from the previous era was that now China was taken seriously as a potential adversary. This was not, however, perceived as a change from bi- to tripolarity at the systemic level, but rather as a strengthening of the anti-Soviet camp.⁴²

4.3 “New Thinking” and the Crisis of the Cult of the Offensive

In the 1980's things began to change, first slowly and then at a pace which outdated Western Sovietological studies overnight. Several factors contributed to the change. Already in the 1970's it had become perfectly clear to Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union would not reach, or come even near, the stated goal of achieving the industrial output of the United States. By the end of the 1970's Soviet leaders were beginning to acknowledge that building a nuclear

triad similar to the US one, while at the same time maintaining conventional superiority and supporting “national liberation movements” in the third world was becoming an unbearable burden to the inefficient Soviet economy. The “new cold war” of the 1980's made this problem even more urgent.⁴³ At the same time, critical discussion about the virtues of offensive grand strategy opened for the first time since Frunze’s views had prevailed over Svechin’s in the 1920's.

The first sign of change was an increase in attention to “defensiveness” among Soviet officers and civilian experts. The criticism of offensive strategy was, however, not at all unanimous, and even the advocates of “defensiveness” ended up with several different definitions of the concept: military officers advocated variants of a “more defensive” strategy instead of exclusive reliance on offensive strategy, while civilian foreign policy analysts placed “defensiveness” within Western discourses of common security and non-offensive defence.⁴⁴ The alternative concepts are worth a closer look, since they form the origin of the division of Soviet strategic culture into two competing “schools of thought” - in many ways similar to the “schools” led by Frunze and Svechin - which can still be found in Russian strategic culture.

Military attention to defensiveness originated in the beginning of the 1980's.⁴⁵ Partly this attention predated Nato’s two offensive operational initiatives in the 1980's - the Air-Land Battle (1982) and Follow-on-Forces Attack (1984), as well as the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (1983) - all of which have been used to explain the increased role of defensive ideas in Soviet strategy. However, it is likely that the increased discussion over defence was largely motivated by a realization that the Soviet theatre posture was based on premises, which Nato’s initiatives threatened.⁴⁶ Throughout the discussion the idea of defensive operations being followed as soon as possible by a strategic counter-offensive was questioned only rarely.⁴⁷ To a large extent, “defensiveness” was, in the proposals of officers, confined to the political-military side of the doctrine.⁴⁸ It is worth noting that it took until the second half of the decade before integrating even some degree of defensiveness into offensive operations became accepted in the mainstream debate in military journals.⁴⁹ Concrete evidence about the military’s reluctance to embrace a non-offensive strategy can be found in the General Staff’s policy to continue to base the structure and preparation of forces - reflected in military exercises as late as 1988 - on the premise that the enemy would ultimately be defeated by a strategic counteroffensive on its own territory.⁵⁰ Moreover, the General Staff continued to

oppose publicly unilateral military concessions and insisted that reductions be carried out on a reciprocal basis.⁵¹ Thus, the school of thought represented by the Soviet military still reflected the Frunzean cult of the offensive.

The other school of thought, represented by civilian foreign and security policy experts working in research institutes, advanced a very different understanding of defensiveness.⁵² The *mezhdunarodniki* (as they were called) understood that the hostile encirclement of the Soviet Union was caused partly by its own past belligerency and current offensiveness.⁵³ In other words, they understood the security dilemma in a way similar to Western defensive realists. During 1987 and 1988 these experts presented several plans for the restructuring and radical downsizing of the Soviet armed forces, claiming that unilateral gestures would benefit the Soviets in negotiations over the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.⁵⁴ There is credible evidence that the Soviet's CFE negotiation position originated in the connections between the *mezhdunarodniki* and the Soviet leadership, including the Foreign Ministry and Gorbachev himself.⁵⁵ The implications of the Soviet position were immense because it signalled that the Soviets were willing to give up, or at least to rethink, their dogma of a strategic counteroffensive in Europe. This effectively outdated NATO's offensive doctrines in the European theatre and opened the way for loosening the link between the U.S. strategic deterrent and the defence of Europe, which had been a goal of the Soviets since the achievement of strategic parity.⁵⁶

While Soviet unilateral moves in reducing conventional forces in Europe were probably the most important move in breaking the cold war security dilemma, similar initiatives were made in other areas of security policy as well. During the 1980's, the role of nuclear deterrence in war prevention - previously a rhetorical cliché motivated by an inability to gain supremacy - became accepted in Soviet discourse first in a way largely identical to mainstream Western nuclear deterrence theory and then in a way similar to proposals of Western non-offensive defence theorists.⁵⁷ The impetus for change came from Soviet scientists, whose views predated those of Soviet military theorists by several years.⁵⁸ By the end of the decade, influential *mezhdunarodniki* had jumped on the issue and developed drastic proposals to downsize nuclear forces while maintaining strategic stability.⁵⁹ While the reductions in Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear weapons in START I and II can well be explained by the collapse of the economic base needed to maintain such expensive weapon systems, one should not overlook the accompanying shift in Soviet/Russian perceptions about

nuclear deterrence, which reflect a qualitatively different understanding of the security dilemma in comparison to previous times.

In short, the change in Soviet grand strategy during the latter half of the 1980's can be summarized as follows. 1) War prevention became a major and sincere element in Soviet strategic thinking 2) An understanding of the security dilemma - that one could not increase Soviet security by increasing the insecurity of the West - replaced the Marxist framework for interpreting the threat from the West 3) Soviet military strategy became "more defensive" in order to erase Western fears about Soviet motivations.⁶⁰ In other words, what took place during Gorbachev's time was the first qualitative change in Soviet grand strategy for over 60 years. The turn marked a turn back to the (defensive) realist school of Soviet strategic culture, which was suppressed by Soviet leaders during the first years of the Soviet Union.

Two points should be made in order to clarify a common misunderstanding related to this process. Some constructivist theorists have argued that the end of the cold war was a result of a reciprocal process of interaction between the two superpowers in which the West reacted positively to the Soviets' unilateral initiatives, which in turn was taken by the Soviets as a signal of good will, setting in motion a spiral of growing trust.⁶¹ In reality, however, the West's reaction (or lack thereof) to Soviet proposals did not satisfy the Soviets, especially the Soviet military. Even in 1988 and 1989 high-ranking Soviet officers continued to express their frustration at the West's offensive doctrines and capabilities.⁶² Moreover, such criticism was not confined to Western offensive doctrines (the maritime strategy, SDI, FOFA, etc.) but was reflected in Soviet discussion over INF, nuclear testing and strategic arms reduction negotiations.⁶³ This suggests that the process that led to the end of the cold war was more one-sided than constructivists have argued and that it was an understanding of the security dilemma, advanced by the *mezhdunarodniki* and made official policy through Gorbachev's personal power that played the key role in ending the cold war.

How, then, was it possible for the *mezhdunarodniki* to get Gorbachev's ear and walk over the military's 60-year monopoly in defence policy, arms control, military strategy, and force posturing? Mainstream constructivists often overlook the personal connections between Gorbachev and the *mezhdunarodniki*, created in the 1986 reshuffle in Gorbachev's staff. By 1987 IMEMO director Aleksandr Yakovlev had risen to full member of politburo, creating a direct link between foreign policy academics and the Soviet leadership. Some of the Soviet

unilateral arms reduction initiatives originated in IMEMO working groups and several prominent researchers took personally part in preparing policy proposals and doctrines. Around the same time, the Foreign Ministry, which later played a key role in the CFE negotiations, institutionalised its link to civilian researchers.⁶⁴ This made it possible for civilian academics to participate in the formulation of policies that had previously been the turf of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Considering the conservativeness of the latter, it is possible that had a channel between the *mezhdunarodniki* and the Soviet leadership not existed, the Soviets would have continued to stick with the (counter)offensive strategy in Europe for much longer and the cold war would not have ended when it did.

5 Systemic Change and Russian Grand Strategy

If discussion about grand strategy had driven Soviet policy during most of the 1980's, the domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union and the geostrategic changes in its environs that began in 1989 made Soviet policy more reactive and outdated much of the discussion about grand strategy. While the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was related to the Soviet leadership's renunciation of the need to launch a large-scale counter-offensive to Western Europe in case conflict broke out,⁶⁵ the series of democratic revolutions in the former Warsaw Pact countries and the extent of changes brought by them was certainly not foreseen by the Soviet elite. Representatives of the two schools of thought, now less coherent than in the preceding years, reacted to the changes in different ways, with the military establishment still wavering between the cult of the offensive and a more defensive strategy, and the *mezhdunarodniki* not knowing whether to advocate a non-offensive defence or full-scale integration with the West.

5.1 The Hardliner Reaction

The reaction of the military establishment to the changed geostrategic circumstances can be found in the debate over the development of military doctrine, which lasted until the end of the Soviet Union and continued as a debate over Russian and CIS military doctrines.

The 1990 draft version of the new military doctrine and the following statements by high-ranking officers reflected a desire to cling to offensive operations. According to the 1990 doctrine the character of operations would be "determined by the nature of the military actions of the opponent and depend on the means and methods of armed struggle that he

uses”.⁶⁶ The following year, in an article on Soviet military doctrine, Igor Rodionov (Head of the General Staff Academy, later to become minister of defence of the Russian Federation) insisted that the Soviet armed forces should be ready to conduct all kinds of military operations.⁶⁷ General Valery Manilov (later to become the primus motor of the development of the Russian national security concept), similarly made a distinction between the political side of the new military doctrine, which was to be based on the ideas of “new thinking”, and the military-technical and military-economic side of the doctrine, which were to be based on “efficiency” and “optimisation”.⁶⁸ Some senior officers, such as admirals Ponikarovskiy and Mikhaylovskiy argued that defence and offence are inseparable and that strategic defence is impossible without tactical and operational offence,⁶⁹ while others made the case that there should be a clear choice between offence and defence at the doctrinal level.⁷⁰ Interestingly, there seemed to be no support at the senior level to the *mezhdunarodniki*’s ideas about a military force incapable of large-scale strategic offensives. Another striking feature in the whole discussion was the inability of the military to define the threats to Soviet security, except at a very general level.⁷¹

As the Soviet Union collapsed, the debate about Soviet military doctrine continued unabated as a debate over Russian military doctrine and CIS military doctrine. Despite significant disagreement over whether a CIS military doctrine was even needed,⁷² a draft of it was produced, based on the 1990 Soviet military doctrine.⁷³ While doctrines have had little to do with the reckless policies of Russia in the CIS area⁷⁴, the CIS military doctrine is worth a closer look, since it introduced the idea of a “multipolar” threat perception into official Russian grand strategy. This concept would later become the central organizing concept of Russian strategic culture. The multipolar risk to security, according to the draft doctrine, consisted of 1) direct military preparations by certain countries against the CIS 2) attempts by other states to station their armed forces into certain countries (including former Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic States) 3) attempts to build up armed forces near the borders of the CIS 4) instability in the military-political situation in the border regions of CIS.⁷⁵ The formulation is significant, because it implies that the military capabilities of other great powers are not threatening by themselves - they become threatening when moved geographically close to other great powers. What logically follows from this is an assumption about “spheres of interest“ which should not be violated by other great powers if peace is to prevail in the international system. Of interest in the doctrine is also a definition of attacks on “dangerous targets” (such as nuclear power plants) by conventional weapons being regarded

as the first use of weapons of mass destruction.

The first draft of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, published in May 1992, is also a most interesting paper.⁷⁶ Unlike the official military doctrine, which was formulated under political guidance from the Ministry of Defence and accepted as an official document in November 1993, the 1992 version bears the imprints of the military high command.⁷⁷ The threat perception in the 1992 doctrine is one where the stability of the emerging multipolar world is seen as threatened by “attempts of states or coalitions of states for dominance at the level of international society or at the regional level and their preference for solving disputes by the use of force”⁷⁸ - most likely a reference to the USA and NATO.⁷⁹ In terms of security dilemma theory, this implies that the General Staff continued to see the Russian-Western security dilemma as a “deterrence dilemma” where the threat from the West consisted of offensive capabilities *and* offensive intentions. The 1992 doctrine also clarifies Rodionov’s 1991 article by stating that Russian military forces should be prepared “to an equal extent to conduct all kinds of military operations - both defensive and offensive”.⁸⁰

5.2 The Liberal/Realist Reaction

The reaction of the foreign ministry was very different from the military’s reaction, and a direct continuation of the *mezhdunarodniki*’s understanding of the security dilemma.⁸¹ The first attempt to systemize Russia’s foreign policy doctrine was based on a view according to which Russia was returning to the community of democratic and civilized countries after half a century of Soviet totalitarianism.⁸² The draft explicitly acknowledged that the Cold War had been a function of ideological confrontation and that “new thinking” had been the first step in ending the confrontation. The underlying worldview seemed to owe a lot to liberal internationalism and the democratic peace theory. According to the doctrine, the shape of the world at the end of the 20th century would depend on “the success of our [Russia’s] reforms and the strength of civil society in Russia” as well as on “it’s [the Russian Federation’s] foreign policy”.⁸³ However, there were also references to political realism - a warning that Russia’s interests would not necessarily correspond to those of Western countries and that the role of Russia in the post-Soviet area could require, as a last resort, the use of force. It is, however, significant that the doctrine explicitly limits the latter to defending human rights and international law and mentions that the likely geographical area where such interventions could take place would be the “Asian parts” of the former Soviet Union (where Russia

already was military involved).⁸⁴

The doctrine also includes an interesting interpretation of multipolarity: the international system is described as “multicentric” (the centres being the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, plus “aspiring regional centres”), where the U.S. “seeks to maintain its leading role”. Contrary to the Draft 92 military doctrine, the theme is not developed into a threat perception in the foreign policy doctrine. Instead, the “economically powerful and technologically advanced Western countries” are described as a potential source of help to Russia in its task of national rebirth.⁸⁵ In the sphere of security politics, the doctrine recognizes the need for armed forces sufficient for defence and deterrence, especially against threats arising from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but places the emphasis on various forms of arms control in ensuring Russia’s security.⁸⁶

The main problem with Kozyrev’s idealism was the lack of a clear paradigm for defining the national interests of Russia. In a revealing quote, Kozyrev defends his worldview to Nixon: “You know Mr. President, that one problem of the Soviet Union was that we were a little too obsessed, as it were, with our national interests. And so now we are more concerned with general human values. But if you have some ideas and can advise us on how to define our national interests, I will be very grateful to you.”⁸⁷

Already as the foreign policy concept was being prepared and debated, a group of influential politicians, civil servants, businessmen, and academics (among them many former new thinkers) expressed their concern about the lack of realism in the concept. The group, which called themselves the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, made their views public in the form of an unofficial strategy paper.⁸⁸ According to their “Strategy for Russia I”, Russia’s foreign policy should be based on a ‘realistic’ and ‘pragmatic’ assessment of Russia’s interests and capabilities, not on the idealistic premises of liberal internationalism. With respect to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Council suggested a process of post-imperial integration – bearing in mind the differences between the former Soviet states. In Russian-Western relations, the Council recommended the maintenance of good relations for the reason that, in effect, Russia did not have any other option. Far-sightedly, the strategy proposal also forecasted that Russian democracy would probably be more authoritarian than the Western liberal model that it supposedly is based on.

6 The First Consensus: Regional Hegemony

The first sign of a consensus in the debate emerged already in September-October 1992, when Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in a series of speeches and interviews, shifted from his previous liberal views concerning Russia's role in the "near abroad" towards geopolitical realism: "Either we learn to conduct military actions to support and establish peace in the zones of our traditional geopolitical interests or we risk losing influence there and the vacuum will be filled by others".⁸⁹ While this semantic shift might seem small, it signalled the end of the brief period of liberal internationalism in Russian foreign policy.⁹⁰

An emergence of wider consensus in the debate was reflected in the officially adopted versions of the foreign policy concept and military doctrine. The foreign policy concept, which gained official status, was prepared in the Security Council in February 1993 under the leadership of Yuri Skokov, the then Secretary of the Council. The President approved this concept in April of the same year. Although the Russian government did not deem it necessary to inform their countrymen or anyone else of the exact contents of the concept, parts of it were leaked to the public.⁹¹ The official concept resembled more closely the realism of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy than it did Kozyrev's idealism, but differed from the former in that its general understanding of Russia's external environment is more pessimistic. While the concept assumed that Russia will remain one of the world's great powers as a result of its potential and influence it also acknowledged that the political environment in which Russia will act will not be as benevolent as the other proposals assumed. This manifested itself in fears of losing influence in the strategic balance between great powers as a result of other states' actions, as well as in the claim that Russia needs to develop partnerships with the Eastern European countries because they are part of Russia's historic sphere of interest.⁹² The primary emphasis in the concept was on the CIS, quite openly described as Russia's current sphere of influence. The document mentioned the development of an effective common defence system, the strengthening of Russia's leadership role and the maintaining of the old Soviet era military infrastructure within the CIS as some of Russia's aims.

The military doctrine that was accepted in November 1993 was in many ways similar to the foreign policy concept adopted the same year.⁹³ The emphasis in the military doctrine was on Russia's neighbouring areas and internal threats to the Federation. Russia's relationship with

the CIS countries was defined through a unilateral right of intervention: the doctrine permitted the use of military force to defend the rights of Russian minorities within the CIS. As was the case with the foreign policy concept, the military doctrine's description of the international system was internally conflictual and unformed. The hawkish assumptions about Western hegemonic intentions, which could be found in the 1992 draft of the military doctrine, were deleted in the official version. Threats mentioned in the doctrine were undefined descriptions of potentially threatening events, rather than an exegesis of wider trends or structural patterns.

A choice between offensive and defensive means of responding to aggression was still not made, and the doctrine reiterated the previous formulation that the armed forces should be ready to conduct both offensive and defensive operations.⁹⁴ The possibility of a major counteroffensive was suggested by the emphasis on strategic and operational manoeuvre and the execution of deep operations. In the sphere of nuclear weapons, the 1993 doctrine departed from the previous drafts in that the "no first use" pledge was not made anymore.⁹⁵ This should, however, not be taken as an alarming sign, since it signalled the official acceptance of (Western) nuclear deterrence theory, (foreshadowed by many articles in Russian military and foreign policy journals earlier) and because the pledge was considered incredible anyway in by the West, especially after the unilateral reductions in Soviet/Russian conventional forces during the previous years.

In sum, the main achievement of the first round of official doctrines was that it consolidated the view of Russia's hegemonic role in the CIS area. The main topics in which consensus was not achieved were the relation of Russia to other powers and the role and tasks of military power in Russian foreign policy.

7 The Debate on Multipolarity

Despite the official approval of the new doctrines, the debate about Russian grand strategy continued. Partly this was due to the fact that the highest document guiding Russian security politics, the National Security Concept, was still in the making.⁹⁶ Another reason was that the foreign policy concept and the military doctrine left many fundamental questions unanswered, thereby generating discussion about what was actually meant by the vague formulations in the documents. Yet another reason was that both Russia's external

environment and domestic balance of power were in a constant state of turmoil, creating pressure for sharper and more nationalistic formulations of Russia's interests.

The main outcome of the debate leading to the approval of the foreign policy concept and the military doctrine was that the liberal internationalist (or pro-Western) school of thought in Russian foreign policy was pushed to the margins. After the CIS area had been defined as a sphere of special interest to Russia where other great powers should not be allowed to enter, there was little room left for liberal ideas about peacekeeping based on Western norms and the protection of democracy and human rights. While the remaining schools of thought were numerous, ranging from moderate liberals via moderate conservatives to communists and nationalists, one can distinguish two main groups of grand strategy proposals. The first group consisted of proposals by "realists", mostly belonging to governmental circles and the business elite. The second group consisted of proposals by "national-patriots" or communists coming from opposition circles and some parts of the military establishment. While the debate between these schools of thought echoed in many ways the previous great debates over grand strategy in Russian history, such as the Svechin-Frunze debate in the 1920's and the *mezhdunarodniki*-military debate in the 1980's, it also had a philosophical dimension with long historical roots.⁹⁷

Most of the post-1993 strategic debate in Russia revolved around the concept of *multipolarity*. Whether one was formulating proposals for Russian national interests in the context of military reform, arms control, or foreign policy towards Nato, EU, CIS, UN, or even ex-Yugoslavia, the underlying presumption was usually that the post-cold war world is a multipolar one, and that Russia is one of its poles. However, the analysis about the dynamics of multipolarity differed significantly between the two schools of thought.

7.1 The National-Patriotic Opposition

The codeword used by the national-patriotic opposition to describe their foreign policy orientation is "pragmatism" (or "healthy national pragmatism").⁹⁸ In reality, there is very little pragmatism in their worldview. When analysing the opposition's worldview, one stumbles into an interpretation of multipolarity, which is based on rather abstract theories about culture, polarity and geopolitics.

The civilizational approach implies that the main actors in the multipolar system are great powers representing different civilizations. These civilizations have their own “general laws of social development”. One of the great powers is Russia, a cultural-spiritual(-religious) whole and a distinctive “social cosmos”, which forms the core (or “heart”) of Eurasian civilization.⁹⁹ Eurasian civilization, as described by Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of KPRF, is characterized by spirituality, collectivism, harmony, discipline, order, sense of justice, and tolerance towards other cultures.¹⁰⁰ The civilization, which differs the most from the Eurasian civilization according to Zyuganov, is Western civilization, which he claims has always been characterized by expansionism. This, Zyuganov claims, has led Western civilization in conflict not only with other civilizations but also with nature. Thus, Zyuganov blames Western civilization and its faith in technology for the current ecological threats to the survival of mankind, such as climate change.¹⁰¹

Ideologically, Zyuganov describes Western civilization as a marriage between antiquity and Judaism, the former being the origin of the division of society into free and enslaved citizens, and the latter bringing with it the idea of “chosen people” which legitimises the unchristian social division of antiquity in the context of modern capitalism. The result, according to Zyuganov, is “democracy to the chosen ones” and a “primitive”, “decadent” political and economic system where humanist ideas have been forgotten.¹⁰² Most problems of contemporary Russia, according to this logic, have been caused by the attempt to import Western liberalism into a Eurasian country.¹⁰³

The national patriotic opposition has developed a sophisticated theoretical discourse about polarity and the international system. According to this discourse, the most dangerous - and currently the most likely type - of international system is a unipolar one, which amounts to the dictatorship of one country and civilization. From this perspective, the brief period of liberal internationalism under Kozyrev was in reality a period when Russia accepted the unipolar ambitions of the United States.¹⁰⁴ A bipolar system is perceived to be the most stable one, but is not seen to be in Russia’s interests, since it would imply an anti-Western pole based on a Russian-Chinese strategic alliance, where Russia would be the weaker partner. The system most conducive to Russia’s interests is thus a multipolar one, even though maintaining stability in a multipolar system according to the opposition requires careful balancing policies.¹⁰⁵

The opposition's keyword for maintaining strategic stability in the multipolar world is "balancing equidistance" (*balansiruyushchiy ravnoudalennost*)¹⁰⁶. However, in practice, their interpretation about the working of the multipolar system is straightforward. Both Zyuganov and RAU-corporation claim that Russia has a common interest with the USA in balancing the EU, Japan, and a potential Muslim bloc - and vice versa: it is in Russia's interest to try to break the trans-Atlantic link and further the role of Germany and France in balancing American power. As a response to the more immediate threat of Nato-enlargement, the opposition suggests that Russia should align itself with those countries that are "threatened" by Nato, such as China, India, Iran, and some other Arabic countries.¹⁰⁷

Besides Eurasian ideology, the opposition's view of multipolarity relies on geopolitical thinking. According to Zyuganov, the oldest and most important component of geopolitics is "geographic determinism", which explains differences in the mentalities of people and nations in reference to geography. Zyuganov traces the development of geopolitical determinism from antiquity via Jean Bodin and Montesquieu to Johan Gottfried Herder, Alexander von Humboldt, and Karl Ritter, and argues that the significance of geographic determinism is in studying political processes and institutions as spatial (not only social) phenomena.¹⁰⁸ From the perspective of geopolitical determinism civilizations have "natural borders" which they should defend.¹⁰⁹ In the case of Eurasia, this means that Russia should seek to restore her great power role and reintegrate the post-Soviet area under Russian control.¹¹⁰ The most reliable form of geopolitical control, according Zyuganov, is military force.¹¹¹

Naturally, Nato-enlargement is of special concern to the national-patriotic opposition. According to the opposition, Nato's post-cold war policies have not been motivated by abstract principles such as spreading democracy, but by expansionist geopolitical aims, especially the building of a wide anti-Russian front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In general, Nato is seen as taking advantage of Russia's weakness in order to limit Russia's possibilities to take care of her security interests. According to this logic, the Nato-Russia summit in Paris (1997) and the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in Helsinki (1997) were capitulations where the current Russian administration became a hostage of Nato.¹¹²

The RAU-doctrine claims that the enlargement of Nato to Russia's borders should be characterized as a direct threat to Russia's national security and that Russia should be ready

for “large-scale measures” to counter it.¹¹³ The doctrine insists that Russian forces should be prepared not only for defensive, but also “counteroffensive and offensive“ operations at the “operational-strategic, operational, and tactical” levels.¹¹⁴ Zyuganov is less explicit, claiming that the size and posture of Russia’s armed forces should be based on “defensive sufficiency”, but that the military doctrine should provide the military the possibility of a symmetric response to US strategies (which are described as offensive and hegemonic).¹¹⁵

7.2 The Realists

From the realists’ perspective, the foreign and security policies of states are based on “rational” economic and military interests, rather than on the characteristics of the civilizations into which they belong.¹¹⁶ Sergei Rogov, for example, has speculated with the possibility that Russia – the largest state in the Orthodox world - may not end up as one of the poles in the emerging multipolar system.¹¹⁷ He has also criticised culture and identity based strategies, which neglect economic realities.¹¹⁸ According to Rogov there is a relation between economic and military power in multipolar systems, just as there was in the bipolar system. The rise of new poles (such as Germany and Japan) in the international system will thus be a function of their role as “economic centres of power” and the need to defend their national interest in an anarchic world, not of their spiritual strength and historical mission.¹¹⁹

In presuming that states are expected utility maximizers instead of bearers of a historical mission, the realists continue the Svechian tradition represented by many of the *mezhdunarodniki*. Threats to national security, according to this tradition, arise not from the alien character of other civilizations or economic systems, but from conflicting security interests between Russia and other states.¹²⁰ These conflicting interests, in turn, originate according to the realists in the “systemic pressures” of international anarchy.¹²¹ This parallels the rhetoric of Yeltsin and it can be presumed that his occasional references to “spiritualness” etc. was lip service designed to satisfy the national-patriotic opposition.¹²²

When discussing multipolarity, the realists agree with the opposition that multipolar systems are more complex, unstable, and unpredictable than bipolar systems (though not necessarily more war-prone).¹²³ However, the absence of any Eurasianist philosophy in the realists’ analyses leads to a somewhat different understanding of the dynamics of multipolarity and the maintenance of peace and stability. While different realists use slightly different concepts,

the underlying logic is neatly summarized in Tsygichko's theory of strategic stability. According to him, stability in international system can be maintained in three ways: 1) parity 2) strategic partnership 3) unipolar hegemony.¹²⁴ Parity, according to Tsygichko, was the name of the game during the cold war bipolar era; strategic partnership among different poles would be the best policy in the present multipolar system. Threats to stability, according to this logic, arise when there is a discrepancy between the *de facto* balance of power and the subjective perceptions and policies of one or more actors. In other words, dangers to stability in a multipolar world arise when the "objective necessity" of multilateral policies, such as "strategic partnership" is being disregarded by an actor with unipolar ambitions.

This is the context in which Russian realists views Nato's policies in the Balkans as well as the whole process of Nato-enlargement. While the realists do not approve of Nato's enlargement, they understand that the driving force behind it is not blind geopolitical expansion, but rather a strive for stability through unipolar hegemony. Thus, it is not so much the end (stability), but the means (unilateralism in a multipolar world), that the realists criticise – and vice versa: it is the means (strategic partnership), not the end (there isn't any), that they praise when they express qualified satisfaction at cooperative institutions such as the Nato-Russia Council.¹²⁵

The realist logic also assumes that the poles of the system are entitled to spheres of interest. However, according to realists the Russian sphere of interest does not arise from culture or history but from the interplay of regional national interests and their relation to the logic of multipolarity. In their policy proposals realists have been careful in distinguishing between different national interests of countries even within the Russian sphere of interest. However, there seems to be a consensus that keeping the military potential of other poles outside of the former USSR territory is a "vital interest" of Russia.¹²⁶

The best grand strategy for Russia to follow, according to realist logic, would be one of pragmatic balancing against US and Western ambitions, in order to strengthen multipolar and multilateral tendencies in the world. This would require countering moves which seek to block the strengthening of Russia's role as one of the poles in the multipolar system¹²⁷ as well as acting as a balancer between the US and other poles of the international system, especially China.¹²⁸ However, as the realists do not advocate any one-sided policies towards the poles of the system, they advocate a flexible policy which combines aspects of partnership and

balancing, depending on the situation.¹²⁹

8 The Second Consensus: Multipolar Balancing

The first official formulation of the multipolarity paradigm can be found from the 1997 National Security Concept.¹³⁰ An early (unofficial) summary of the new military doctrine, published in February 1998 echoes the same ideas.¹³¹ The paradigm behind the doctrines is one in which the world is perceived as moving “objectively” towards multipolarity and where the threat to the stability of the international system comes from unipolar ambitions.¹³² The National Security Concept does not mention by name the United States as the actor with unipolar ambitions, but that can be deduced from the references to Nato-enlargement and other processes. The summary of the military doctrine does talk openly of American hegemonic ambitions.

The doctrines do not even contemplate the possibility that in the future the international system would stay unipolar or that international relations may have qualitatively changed in such a way as to assign the use of military power in international relations to the pages of history. Nor is Russia’s role as one of the poles in the emerging multipolar system questioned. Russia’s interests as a “great Eurasian power” are defined as ranging from Europe through the Middle East to Central and South-East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The other poles mentioned by name are the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, and India.

The recent drafts of the National Security Concept¹³³ and Military Doctrine¹³⁴ as well as the ratified version of the National Security Concept¹³⁵ continue along these lines, while reflecting a more sophisticated and developed understanding of multipolarity. They also bear the imprint of several international developments, especially Nato’s intervention in Kosovo, Russia’s war in Chechnya, Nato’s continuing enlargement process, and US attempts to modify the ABM treaty to permit limited missile defences. As a result, the general mood reflected in the new doctrines is more pessimistic than in the previous doctrines.

However, when one analyses the paradigm on which the doctrines are based, a familiar picture begins to emerge – one that resembles the worldview of the realists much more closely than that of the national-patriotic opposition.¹³⁶ At the core of the doctrines is the

assumption about unipolar ambitions destabilizing the multipolar world. Contrary to the 1997 Concept, the 2000 Concept now refers openly to the US as the main source of instability and describes in more detail how the interests of Russia are ignored when solving major problems of international relations. A change of emphasis can also be found in the argument that the world *is* now multipolar, not developing towards it (as pronounced in the 1997 Concept).

Threat perceptions in the Concept reflect this logic. Two new formulations are worth a closer look. First, Russia claims to be worried about the “attempts of states and intergovernmental organizations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for the maintenance of international security, primarily the UN and the OSCE”.¹³⁷ The same argument is repeated in a reference to Nato’s new strategic concept and the intervention in Kosovo: “Nato’s recourse to the practice of using military force outside the bloc’s zone of responsibility without UN Security Council sanction, now elevated to the rank of a strategic doctrine, threatens to destabilise the entire global strategic situation”. Thus, operations perceived in the West as being based primarily on humanitarian concerns, are seen in Russia as part of a bid for global domination.¹³⁸ This is a particularly useful formulation in Russian domestic politics since it resonates well with traditional Soviet-style paranoia about American intentions, while at the same time fitting nicely into the logic of the multipolarity paradigm.

A second interesting novelty is an explicit concern over “the possible presence of foreign military bases and large military contingents in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders”. This argument has previously been made by several Russian officials, and it can be found in the draft CIS military doctrine (see above) as well as Russia’s initial negotiation position in the Nato-Russia Permanent Joint Council.¹³⁹ There is no doubt that the concern over foreign military bases and contingents refers to Nato’s continuing enlargement process. Based on previous definitions of Russia’s sphere of interests, it is safe to say that it almost certainly refers (among others) to the Baltic States. What is worth noting at this point is that the present formulation ties the Baltic region into the logic of multipolar balancing in a tighter way than earlier formulations. If the unipolar ambitions of the US are seen as the main threat to the stability of the international system, then the attempts of Russia’s Baltic neighbours to gain formal security guarantees from Nato are not perceived by Moscow primarily as a regional security problem, but as an integral part of the most important threat to Russia’s national security.

How then, should Russia respond to the unipolar threat? According to the National Security Concept, the level and posture of the “military potential of the state” is to be raised to a “sufficiently high” level.¹⁴⁰ The relationship with the US pole in the international system is downgraded from “partnership” to pragmatic “cooperation”.¹⁴¹

The much-hyped “new nuclear doctrine” in the Concept consists of three separate arguments. According to the first “It is vital to the Russian Federation to keep up its deterrence capability in the interest of preventing aggression on whatever scale, including when nuclear arms are used against Russia and its allies”. The size of the deterrent is described vaguely: “The Russian Federation must have nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing that appropriate damage will be inflicted on any aggressor state or coalition of states whatever the circumstances”. The conditions of the use of nuclear weapons consists of: “All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted or have proved to be ineffective.” The formulations in the military doctrine (which is supposed to concretise the National Security Concept) are equally vague. Deterrence is described as an effective way of preventing aggression against Russia and its allies; the size of the damage that would be inflicted on the aggressor is not described in any detail; and the right to use nuclear weapons is retained for all situations critical to national security.¹⁴²

Noteworthy about these formulations is precisely their vagueness, which leaves room for speculation. Unlike previous doctrines, the new doctrines do not define any clear boundaries or thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. The most plausible conclusion is that the formulations simply reflect the weakness of Russia in the sphere of conventional forces. If one takes at face value the pessimistic interpretation of the international situation provided by the doctrines then it is only logical that Russia would seek to maximize its security by whatever means it has available. This could still be regarded as a “defensive” nuclear doctrine. The other, more pessimistic, conclusion is related to Russia’s desperate desire to be one of the poles in the multipolar system: since Russia no more possesses any other instrument for playing great power politics, the value of nuclear weapons as instruments for political coercion and war-fighting (e.g. the use of tactical nuclear weapons in regional conflicts) could have been raised aside the old function of deterrence. Only time will tell which conclusion is correct.¹⁴³

Another, less publicized novelty in the doctrine is a reference to the “strategic deployment” of forces and the inclusion of the words “Navy units” to the description of Russia’s military presence in the “vital regions of the world”. While the doctrine does not elaborate on the point, two unofficial strategy papers published recently reflect the extent of Russian power projection ambitions. The other talks of “universal expeditionary groups” as Russia’s answer to American-style aircraft carrier battle groups.¹⁴⁴ The other, an unofficial document prepared on the initiative of a group of admirals and officers of the Russian Navy, is more diplomatic, but does include an ambitious long-term build-up program involving aircraft carriers and strategic missile submarines.¹⁴⁵ While these plans sound rather utopian when Russia’s economic weakness is taken into consideration, one should take into account that Russia has already taken the first step towards blue-water power projection by pursuing an ambitious refitting and modernising program of the gigantic Ushakov-class (former Kirov-class) battle cruisers (to the surprise of Western analysts)¹⁴⁶ and that the problems in financing the weapons systems of the new Borey-class strategic missile submarines have reportedly been solved. Such developments would not only present the West with a new challenge - reckless Russian battle groups showing the flag and protecting Russia’s “interests” in the world’s hot spots - but also stop the decline of the strategic significance of the Kola peninsula and surrounding areas. This, in turn, would have effects on the regional balance of power.

In sum, the new doctrines reflect a grimmer and somewhat more militarised worldview than the previous ones. The Russian national security elite has reacted to the continuing decline of Russia’s standing in international politics by a constructing an increasingly nationalistic and assertive grand strategy. The motives of the West with respect to Kosovo, Nato-enlargement, or missile defences are demonised in a rather worrisome way, and military force is still regarded as by far the most important instrument of power in international relations.¹⁴⁷ Thus, if the main achievement of the 1991-1993 round of doctrines was to consolidate a view of Russia as a regional hegemon, the 1997-2000 round seems to reflect a consensus on the imperative to balance against Western power in order to promote a multipolar international system.

Three general implications of Russia’s contemporary grand strategy seem to be evident. First, Russia will continue (mis)investment taxpayer money (and diverting foreign loans, if possible) into procuring and deploying new weapons systems and modernizing old ones. This will not only force the West to keep up its defences – a marginal problem considering the

wealth of Western countries - but also ensure domestically that the Russian economy will remain weak for the foreseeable future. The need to legitimise the continuing belt-tightening is, in turn, likely to be reflected in increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic propaganda.¹⁴⁸

Second, in its desperate desire to balance against the West and to promote a multipolar world, Russia will probably increase its cooperation with the other presumed poles of the international system, especially China, and continue its cooperation with anti-Western rogue states with whom it has mutual interests especially in the sphere of arms trade and military R&D. Such cooperation will probably not take the form of conventional alliances, but appear on a case-to-case basis in forms, which make possible plausible deniability.

Third, since Russia perceives itself as the hegemonic power in the post-Soviet area, Moscow will tolerate the interference of external actors – whether states or institutions – only in cases when it perceives such interference to be in the Russian national interest. The linkage between regional dominance and multipolar balancing, elaborated in the recent round of doctrines, means that such a national interest in conflicts in the post-Soviet area is unlikely to appear anytime soon.¹⁴⁹

9 Conclusion: the Nordic-Baltic Security Dilemma at the Turn of the Century

Before discussing the implications of contemporary Russian grand strategy for the Nordic-Baltic region, it is useful to summarize the main changes in the strategic situation in the region.

Russian military capabilities in the in the proximity of Finland, after a brief increase due to moving hardware to the flank zones of the CFE treaty, during the 1990's to approximately half of what they had been a decade earlier. At the same time, the emphasis in Russian training shifted from conventional weapons to tactical nuclear weapons (which are currently being modernized), and mobile rapid deployment forces. These changes were underlined by the upgrading of the Northern Military District to a frontline military district. Sweden and Finland, while not applying for NATO-membership, increased their cooperation with the alliance through PfP and began (and rapidly executed) an extensive Planning and Review Process to increase interoperability.

The security situation of region was further changed by the reappearance of independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose relations with Russia were complicated by border problems, minority rights, and an open desire for Western security guarantees. While the first two problems have by and large been solved, Russia has made it clear through declarations and military signalling (especially force deployment and military exercises) that it will not accept the enlargement of NATO into post-Soviet territory, and prefers to keep the Baltic States in its sphere of interest.

While the military threat faced by the Nordic and Baltic states at the beginning of the 21st century is in some ways similar to earlier periods, there are important differences, which arise from changes in the grand strategies of major powers. As argued earlier, the ability of Finland and the Baltic states to balance against Soviet power during the pre-war era was made difficult by three factors: First, Stalin's mistrust on the desire and ability of Finland and the Baltic states to stay outside of the German orbit; second, Moscow's Frunzean strategy, which precluded alternatives based on strategic defence; third, the fact that Germany - the only Western power able to provide security guarantees for Finland and the Baltic states - *did* have an offensive grand strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, one that could be read straight from *Mein Kampf*.

The cold war security dilemma in the region was, in turn, shown to be characterized by a more one-sided threat: Soviet offensiveness, mitigated only by the technological and economic backwardness of the Soviet empire. It was argued that the concerted way in which the (remaining) small states in the region balanced against Soviet power was made possible by the fact that they could now rely on a Western power that sought to deter and contain the Soviet Union, not to invade it. Moscow's restraint, when evident, was certainly not due to a lack of offensiveness, as shown above.

According to the interpretation provided in this study, the main change in Soviet/Russian grand strategy began in the mid-1980's, when the offensive-messianic tradition, dominant in Russian strategic culture since Frunze's time, came under attack from the defensive-realist "new thinkers". The end of the cold war, it was argued, was largely a function of the change in Soviet/Russian grand strategy from an offensive to a defensive posture, resulting in the disappearance of the rationale for the existence of the Warsaw Pact and outdating Western fears of surprise offensive in the Central Front.

The above analysis of post-cold war Russian strategic thinking shows how the defensive realist school came under attack from the national-patriotic opposition and military hardliners, and how a consensus on the main tenets of Russian grand strategy was gradually achieved between the two schools of thought. The consensus, it was argued, emerged from two debates, the first revolving around the development of the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine in 1993, the second relating to the development of the Russian National Security Concepts of 1997 and 2000, and the publication of the new Military Doctrine. According to this study, the main achievement of the first round of doctrines was the consolidation of the idea of Russia as the regional hegemon in the CIS/post-Soviet region, while second round of doctrines reflects a consensus about the logic of multipolarity and Russia's consequent need to balance against perceived American hegemonic ambitions.

What are the implications of the present consensus on Nordic and Baltic security? The most important implication is that Russian policy in the Baltic Sea region will probably be based on the same imperative as in all other azimuths: the imperative of deploying military hardware and building a coalition to balance against American power and hegemonic ambitions. Noteworthy here is that it is precisely *American* ambitions (and, thus, Nato), which are at the core of Moscow's threat perception – not for example the enlargement of the European Union or any other organization. In fact, according to the Russian multipolarity paradigm, the widening and deepening of the EU is a *positive* thing, even when it encroaches upon Russia's self-declared sphere of interest, because it is perceived as strengthening the European pole in the international system and thus weakening American hegemony. This (mis)perception is ironic, since strengthening the military capabilities of Europe – America's most reliable and powerful ally in defending and promoting liberal democracy - seems to be an integral part of US policy.

Another implication following directly from contemporary Russian grand strategy is that nuclear weapons have come to play a more important role in Russian foreign policy, including the regional level. Three aspects are worth emphasizing in this respect. First, since Russia sees regional security problems as linked to the logic of multipolarity, the probability that (tactical) nuclear weapons could be used as instruments of political coercion has increased. This is primarily so because nuclear weapons are Russia's only remaining instrument for playing the role of a great power and deterring other powers from entering its sphere of interest. Second, since nuclear weapons can now be used against “any situation”

against “any aggressor”, whether armed with conventional or nuclear weapons, and because nuclear weapons are now described not only as weapons of deterrence but also of “protection” it is not impossible that Russian military strategy in the Nordic-Baltic region would have attributed tactical nuclear weapons a war-fighting role with a lower threshold of usage. Thirdly – and this is of utmost importance - the Russian nuclear doctrine at the *strategic* level seems still purely defensive. The understanding of nuclear deterrence theory, consolidated during the 1980’s, is still at the heart of Russian grand strategy. This means that while Russia considers American ambitions threatening to its sphere of interest, the Russian elite does not share the paranoia of the pre-Gorbachev years regarding a Western nuclear threat to Russian heartland.

In conclusion, the security dilemma faced by the Nordic and Baltic states at the turn of the century is without historical precedent. The good news is that the security dilemma is now more stable than the pre-war security dilemma (characterised by offensive German ambitions on Russian heartland) and the cold war security dilemma (including misperceived Western ambitions on Russian heartland). The bad news is that Russia still perceives the US as harbouring offensive ambitions on the Russian sphere of interest, and that part of this sphere is in the Baltic Sea region. The role of weapons of mass destruction in this game - as symbols of polarity and as instruments of coercion – makes the problem particularly grave.

While there is no simple solution to the problem, three elements, on which a solution could be based, seem to be evident. First, the role of the European Union in providing indirect security guarantees by integrating the Baltic States to the West as fast as possible is vital. Russian misunderstandings and wishful thinking related to transatlantic cleavages is something that the West could find most useful in this respect. Second, Russia’s *legitimate* interests in the region should be taken into consideration. In practice, this means that the West should keep up the pressure on the Baltic states in issues related to the civil rights of Russian minorities, and that the posture of Western conventional military infrastructure in the region - however organised in formal terms- should be strictly defensive (and verifiably so, if possible). These steps would reassure the realists in Moscow about the defensive nature of Western strategy. Finally, any long-term strategy for securing the small states in the region should take into consideration the nuclear dimension (so often misunderstood by Finns and Swedes in particular). Since the logic of nuclear deterrence does not presume a certainty of response, but one of *uncertainty*, the West can afford to be creative in its response to Russia’s

new nuclear doctrine – which in itself is a brilliant example of the utilization of uncertainty. A practical policy to this end could include enlarging Nato to include Sweden and Finland (a theme that is sure to resurface in the ongoing discussions about merging the EU and the WEU), while the Balts would be offered temporary and informal security guarantees in a form short of full Nato-membership. These three elements could be the basic features of a new Nordic-Baltic balance, tailor-made to take into account the interests of and grand strategies of all actors in the region, and credible enough to ensure the security of the Baltic states as Russia continues its painful march towards democracy.

In sum, this study has shown that Russia has created a relatively consistent grand strategy vis-à-vis the US, the EU, and other poles in the international system, and that this grand strategy is clearly threatening to the security of small non-aligned states in the Nordic-Baltic region. Unless the US and the EU are able to develop more coherent and realistic Northern Dimensions to their grand strategies, it seems that Russia – despite her economic weakness - will be able to play a disproportionately large role in the security politics of the region in the coming years.

¹ The seminal work is Jack Snyder's *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, 1977). A useful collection of articles utilizing the concept is Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.) *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). The study of strategic culture and grand strategy is a growing industry. For references to recent works, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 32-44; Colin S. Gray, "Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back," *Review of International Studies* Vol. 25, No. (January 1999), pp. 49-69; Arthur Hoffmann and Kelly Longhurst, "German Strategic Culture in Action," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1999), pp. 31-32.

² Jack Snyder defines strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation or share with each other with regard to ... strategy" (p. 8). In a recent influential work, Alastair Iain Johnston argues that strategic culture consists of assumptions about "the role of war in human affairs" and "the efficacy of the use of force" and appears in the form of a "limited, ranked set of *grand-strategic preferences* over actions that are consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time" (Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], pp. 37-38). Charles Kupchan uses strategic culture in a more limited sense as referring to "the images and symbols that shape how a polity conceives of the relationship between empire and national security" (Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994], p. 28.)

³ Johnston, op. cit., p. 1. This should not be taken as a constructivist argument, i.e. as a claim that strategic culture is a sum of individual beliefs which in turn give meaning to material referents such as weapons, but rather as a structuralist (in the anthropological sense) argument that (strategic) culture precedes the individual. Individuals might speak about strategic culture, but strategic culture also speaks through individuals in ways that individuals are not fully conscious of. The transmitting of strategic culture from one generation to another can be presumed similar to the transmitting of culture and political culture (though in an elitist and elaborate form) - a process of socialization to a pattern of self-other relations that starts before the individual even recognizes himself to be an individual. (See Henriikki Heikka, *Decentred Subjectivity and the Logic of Anarchy: Theoretical Reflections on the Russian-Western Security Dilemma* (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, 1999), pp. 37-64.

⁴ The presumed consistency has also a methodological dimension: to have any analytical meaning at all, strategic culture should be presumed to be reasonably persistent throughout historical periods. It is worth noting that in this sense the paradigm differs from constructivism, which presumes that national self-images are a function of interaction and can therefore change rapidly and be relatively easily influenced from outside.

⁵ For an introduction to neorealism and security dilemma theory, see Heikka, *Decentred Subjectivity and the Logic of Anarchy...*

⁶ For a historical overview of the region's security problems, see Bo Huldt, "Nordic Security - A Historical Perspective," in Mathias Jopp and Riku Warjovaara (eds.) *Approaching the Northern Dimension of the CFSP: Challenges and opportunities for the EU in the emerging European security order* (UPI/IEP, 1998), pp. 37-49.

⁷ For examples for Soviet (mis)perceptions of Finland's pre-war intentions, see Max Jakobson, *Väkivallan vuodet: 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös I* (Helsinki: Otava, 1999), pp. 237-247.

⁸ On the extent of Finnish-Estonian cooperation, see Jari Leskinen, *Veljien Valtiosalaisuus: Suomen ja Viron salainen sotilaallinen yhteistyö Neuvostoliiton hyökkäyksen varalle vuosina 1918-1940*. (Helsinki: WSOY, 1999).

⁹ Cited in Jakobson, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁰ The concept "Nordic balance" appeared in political rhetoric already in the late 1940's, but received its first systematic treatment in Arne Olav Brundtland's article, "The Nordic Balance: Past and Present" (*Cooperation and Conflict*, II/1966). It is worth noting that even though the Nordic balance argument is often referred to as a "theory", Brundtland himself never presented it as a scientific theory but simply as a "term" referring to a complex and evolving situation.

¹¹ During the cold war, Finnish critics of the concept pointed out that no "balance" existed in the region, neither in political or military terms. Politically, the Nordic balance term was labeled as misleading because Finland's eastward-leaning neutrality did not amount to a military alliance similar to the Nato-membership of Denmark and Norway and because the Nordic countries were never posed against each other in a way implied by balance of power thinking. Militarily, the amount of Soviet forces in the high North as well as in the Baltic Sea rim outnumbered the Western presence in the region, making the idea of the existence of a military balance between East and West in the region questionable. See Risto Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective* (Helsinki: National Defence College, 1994), pp. 41, 69, fn. 38. However, in retrospect it seems that Finnish criticism was targeted less at the use of the term in academic discourse (remarks such as those cited above would not have constituted a criticism of e.g. Brundtland's seminal article) and more on the use of the term in political discussion, where it picked up a life of its own.

¹² It should be said right away that I do not give much credibility to the argument that the Nordic balance argument should be refuted because it was (supposedly) "clearly dangerous from the perspective of Finnish foreign and security policy". See Mikko Majander, "The Paradoxes of Finlandization", *Northern Dimensions* 1999, pp. 86. This is so for three reasons. First, there is little evidence (unfortunately) that Soviet leaders would have based their strategic calculations on articles published in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Second, academic arguments should be refuted because they are false, incorrect, or illogical, not because they may be "dangerous" to someone. (In fact, if Finns, Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes had *not* taken seriously an argument that, at least according to this author, quite accurately described the situation they were in, the consequences could have been disastrous). Third, Brundtland's 1966 article explicitly acknowledged the possibility that the development of military technology had outmoded any kind of 'automatism' in the balance, and that Soviet pressure on Finland may be motivated more by political than military concerns. See Brundtland, op. cit., p. 54.

¹³ Finnish discussion has tended to treat arguments about the Nordic balance and Finlandization as part of the same phenomenon – "ignorant foreigners" trying to interpret (the supposedly unique) case of Finland through cold war intellectual frameworks (see e.g. Majander, op. cit.). However, from the perspective of IR theory, the two frameworks are

qualitatively different, the former being a (sub)systemic level term (though underdeveloped as a theory) referring to the strategic dynamics of the region, the second term referring to Finland's domestic situation and her relation to the Soviet Union. It is entire possible to subscribe to the underlying logic of the Nordic balance argument, while being sceptical about the usefulness of the whole concept of Finlandization.

¹⁴ If this may seem like an overly simplistic description of the situation - after all, Sweden was an outspoken critic of Nato during many periods of the cold war, and Finland did show worrying signs of self-censorship throughout the cold war - one should evaluate the argument in light of what it seeks to describe: the hard core of national security policies. In the case of Sweden, moral condemnation of Nato's policies was never allowed to interfere with covert cooperation with Nato in a wide range of fields from air operations and intelligence sharing to military R&D. (See e.g. *Had There Been a War... Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969*. Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Stockholm 1994. [Statens offentliga utredningar 1994: 11]). Finland, in turn, while bearing the image of an "eastward-leaning neutral" (with the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] restricting her room of maneuver), kept firm throughout the cold war in avoiding any concessions to the Soviets in the sphere of actual military cooperation.

¹⁵ Andrei A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 1.

¹⁶ One should not, however, exaggerate the defensive nature of imperial Russia. As Richard Pipes has argued: "A country does not become the largest state in the world, as Russia has been since the seventeenth century, merely by absorbing or repelling foreign invasions". Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet state," *Daedalus*, (Fall 1980), p. 2.

¹⁷ According to David Jones, "[T]he important fact is that the Russians believe they have been constantly threatened, and their military traditions and policies naturally tend to reflect that conviction. And indeed, given the facts of Russia's military past, this belief is not without basis". David Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Jacobsen , op. cit., p. 38. By "structural factors" I refer to polarity, geography and technology, as is usually done by neorealists.

¹⁸ Frunze, sometimes called the "Soviet Clausewitz", was a professional Bolshevik revolutionary, who later became the Soviet Union's leading military theorist and a high ranking military official. The spirit of his formulations of military doctrine and other basic concepts of security policy was reflected in the Big Soviet Encyclopedia up to Gorbachev's time. Before his death in 1925, Frunze held the position of People's Commissar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, which essentially equalled the post of Minister of Defence. On Frunze, see W. D. Jacobs, *Frunze, The Soviet Clausewitz, 1885-1925* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).

¹⁹ A useful introduction to Frunze's role in Soviet strategic culture is Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, *M. V. Frunze: Military Theorist* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).

²⁰ Cited in Kokoshin, op. cit., p 65. Kokoshin points out (p. 67) that the concept of "besieged fortress" was maintained in circulation in the Soviet Union until the 1980's.

²¹ Citation from Kokoshin, op.cit., pp. 147-148. The views of the Frunzean school of thought are well documented in Western literature dating from the cold war. See e.g. Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 5-12.

²² See Gareev, op. cit., pp. 146-163. While believing that the conflict between the socialist motherland and capitalist countries would be long and protracted, Frunze also considered the possibility - still reiterated by Soviet officers in 1988 - that merely “one crushing blow from outside” would be enough to make the rotten capitalist system collapse.

²³ Svechin was a former czarist general, who briefly held the post of chief of staff in the Red Army in 1918, and spent the rest of his career in the Military Academy of the Red Army.

²⁴ A.A. Svechin, “Strategy and Operational Art,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991: The Documentary Basis (Volume I, Operational Art, 1927-1964)* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 5-32, see especially pp. 16-18. For an exhaustive analysis, see Kokoshin, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 4. Svechin’s geostrategic arguments about the location of new industrial enterprises could be characterized as “geoeconomic” ones - to use the catchword of current realist strategists in Moscow.

²⁵ Kokoshin, op. cit., p. 36. While the historical chain of events, which led the advocates of an offensive strategy to prevail over their domestic opposition, is too complex to be documented here, it is worth noting that the “cult of the offensive” prevailed also in the czarist army, and that about 75 000 czarist officers had ended up in the Red Army after the revolution. However, Kokoshin mentions Neznamov and N. P. Mikhnevich, a general and strategist as advocates of strategic defence in the Czarist army. Kokoshin, pp. 13, 148-157. On the “cult of the offensive” and WW I strategies, see Steven van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and World War I,” *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 58-107.

²⁶ Gareev, op. cit., pp. 95-120. This explains the heavy emphasis on the development of Soviet military doctrine in the following analysis of Soviet grand strategy. A comprehensive definition of military doctrine continued until Gorbachev’s time. “Soviet military doctrine transcends the Soviet Armed Forces. It impacts all aspects of Soviet life, whether it be the military-patriotic education of Soviet youth, the location of new industries, or scientific exchanges with the non-communist world”. Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 254.

²⁷ Prominent Soviet strategists who developed the concept, included M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, A.I. Yegorov, and V. K. Triandafilov (Triandofilov). See M. Zakharov, “On the Theory of Deep Operation, *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991: The Documentary Basis (Volume II, Operational Art, 1965-1991)* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 108-120; Gareev, op.cit., pp. 203-222; Scott & Scott, op. cit., pp. 12-15; Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 160-163.

²⁸ G. Isserson, “The Evolution of Operational Art,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991: The Documentary Basis (Volume I, Operational Art, 1927-1964)* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 48-77, esp. pp. 62-77. (Originally published in *Voyna i revolyutsiya* in 1932).

²⁹ G. Isserson, “Operational Prospects for the Future,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 78-90. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1938).

³⁰ Stalin’s anti-fascist stance had, of course, little to do with ideological considerations – his definition of fascism included the moderate German social democrats (“Social Fascists”) – and much with calculations of power, both domestic and international. See Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (London: Pimlico, 1990), esp. pp. 195-205.

³¹ Kokoshin, op. cit., p. 92.

³² N. Talenskiy, “The Development of Operational Art According to the Experience of Recent Warfare,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 141-165. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1945); V. Zlobin & A. Vetoshnikov, “Concerning Soviet Army Operational Art,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 168-205. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1947).

³³ See e.g. L. Vetoshnikov, “Operational Art and its Place in Soviet Military Art,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 206-217. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1949); V. Zlobin, “The Triumph of Soviet Operational Art in the Great Patriotic War,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 218-236. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1950).

³⁴ Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 111-115, 169-172. According to Mary Glantz, recently declassified archival material suggests that the General Staff was able to manage the development of military art behind Stalin’s back. Glantz, op. cit., p. 452, fn. 27. On Stalin’s paranoia about the intentions of the West (and particularly the U.S. military), see Wojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

³⁵ This was reflected in the strategic debate as well. See P. Rotmistrov, “On Modern Soviet Military Art and its Characteristic Features,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 269-284. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1958).

³⁶ Mary Glantz: “The Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 3/1994, pp. 453-454.

³⁷ B. Golovchiner, “Some questions of Modern Operational Art,” in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 287-297 (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1961); I. Mariyevsky, “Formation and Development of the Theory of Operational Art (1918-38) in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. I)*, pp. 298-314. (Originally published in *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal* in 1962). Mariyevsky’s article is interesting because it seeks to rehabilitate some of Svechin’s operational concepts in the context of offensive deep operations - thus questioning many Stalinist excesses concerning offensive operations.

³⁸ Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 175-177. There is reason to believe that the Soviet-Finnish Note Crisis was related to these plans, since in 1962 the Soviets deployed the SAM-5 (Nato-codename Griffon) around Leningrad. It was to be play a part in the Soviet ABM-program to which high hopes were placed at the time. See Bluth, op. cit., p.52. Also the Soviets’ willingness to back down from their initial demand supports this explanation: there was considerable opposition against allocating resources to the ABM project (falling under the control of the *PVO-Strany*) from the rest of the military establishment, especially the

powerful strategic rocket forces, which favoured building more ICBM's.

³⁹ Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 172-175.

⁴⁰ However, as we now know, the Soviets continued to develop their ABM systems until the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to some experts, Russia continues to develop both national and theatre ABM systems. See William Lee, *The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1997).

⁴¹ On procurement of strategic nuclear weapons in this phase, see Pavel L. Podvig, *Strategicheskoe Yadernoe Vooruzhenie Rossii*, (Moskva: IzdAT, 1988) pp. 9-17.

⁴² Kokoshin, pp. 127-132; Scott & Scott, pp. 68-92.

⁴³ For a defense and clarification of the argument that the relative decline of Soviet power set in motion the process that led to the end of the cold war, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* vol. 19, no. 3, p. 91-129.

⁴⁴ A number of detailed studies have been published on the debate. See e.g. Roy Allison, "New thinking about defence in the Soviet Union," in Ken Booth (ed.) *New thinking about security and strategy* (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), pp. 215-243; R. Hyland Phillips & Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense," *International Security*, vol. 13., no. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 164-178; Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security*, vol. 13., no. 2, pp. 124-163 (Fall 1988); Snel, op. cit.; Glanz, op. cit.

⁴⁵ For useful analyses of the discussion in military circles, see Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 180-192; E. D. Grebish, "Evolutsiya doktrinal'nykh ustanovok v sovetskom voennom iskusstve v 80-godakh," *Voennaya mysl'*, no. 6 (1991), p. 31-37.

⁴⁶ P. G. Skachko, "Simultaneous Action against the Entire Depth of the Enemy's Operational Structure - Leading Trends in the Development of Theory of Operational Art," in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art ... (Vol. II)*, pp. 254-262, see esp., p. 261 (Originally published in *Voennaya mysl'* in 1985). Interestingly, Snel has argued that the increasing debate over defensiveness in Soviet military journals in early 1980's can to a large extent be explained as a reaction to the offensive euphoria of the 1970's, during which offensive concepts were advanced for their own sake. Instead of acting simply as an instrument of coercion, Western offensive initiatives created a window of opportunity for Soviet officers to advance their ideas about (more) defensive operations. Snel, op. cit., p. 212. See also Bluth, op. cit., p. 88; Meyer, op. cit., pp. 153.

⁴⁷ Even in 1991 General Grebish described counteroffensive operations "of different size" as compatible with Western ideas of non-offensive defense. E. D. Grebish, "Evolutsiya doktrinal'nykh ustanovok," p. 37.

⁴⁸ For more dovish views presented by high-ranking officers, see Yuriy Kirshin, "Politika i voennaya strategiya v yadernyy vek," *MEiMO*, no. 11 (1998) pp. 35-45; V. F. Andreyev, "Voенно-strategicheskii paritet kak faktor sderzhivaniya," *Voennaya mysl'*, no. 2 (1989).

⁴⁹ One major turning point can be identified in the collective lead article "The Defensive

Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine and Troop (Force) Preparation, in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art... (Vol. II)*, pp. 274-287. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1988).

⁵⁰ Glantz, op. cit., p. 459-462. Indeed, recent findings from East German archives suggest that the Soviet military leadership continued to insist on traditional ideas of offensive defence even as Gorbachev was officially announcing the adoption of purely defensive concepts. Beatrice Heuser, "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970's and 1980's: Findings in the East German Archives," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 12, no. 4 (October-December 1993), pp. 437-457, cited in Snel, op. cit., p. 216, fn. 66.

⁵¹ Snel, op. cit., 218-222.

⁵² The network of research institutes was established by a decision taken in the 20th Congress of the CPSU, after the Soviet leadership had acknowledged the lack of expert analysis in foreign and security policy. The most relevant institutes, in order of appearance, were the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Institute of the United States and Canada (ISKAN), and the Institute of Europe.

⁵³ See e.g. Jack Snyder, "The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond," in Rosecrance and Stein, op. cit., p. 189. The arguments advanced by the *mezhdunarodniki* concerning European security were strikingly similar to those of dovish Western experts. See e.g. Richard New Lebow, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steve E. Miller, & Stephen Van Evera, *Soviet Military Policy: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), pp. 312-346. (Lebow's article was originally published in 1985.)

⁵⁴ See e.g. Andrei A. Kokoshin & Valentin V. Larionov, "Protivostoyanie sil obshego naznacheniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoi stabil'nosti'," *MEMO*, no. 6 (1988), pp. 23-31; Andrei A. Kokoshin & Andrei V. Kortunov, "Stabil'nost' i peremeny v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyah'," *SShA*, no. 7, (1987); Andrei Kokoshin & Valentin V. Larionov, "Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoy oboronitel'noy doktriny," *MEMO*, no. 8 (1987), pp. 32-40, see especially the policy proposals on pp. 39-40. The article also shows the influence of Svechin's realism for the *mezhdunarodniki*.

⁵⁵ Snel, op. cit, pp. 223-224.

⁵⁶ Obviously, such proposals were attractive also for Western Europe, even though Europeans had expressed serious concern about the decoupling of Nato's strategic and theatre-level deterrent during the INF negotiations (especially after the zero-option became a real possibility). The logical consequence of the Soviet unilateral proposals in the conventional sphere was the decrease in the main conventional threat to Western European security, which had been - together with Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles - the rationale for coupling the theatre and strategic level deterrent of Nato in the first place.

⁵⁷ Officially, the no-first-use pledge was made in 1982. However, the principle remained undeveloped and its operational aspects were not specialized, which made it rather unconvincing. Kokoshin, op. cit., p. 180-181.

⁵⁸ Kokoshin, op. cit., pp. 132-137.

⁵⁹ The most radical proposal by Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov implied a twenty-

fold reduction in strategic arms. Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, "On the balance of power," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 8 (1988), pp. 3-13; For other proposals. see Aleksei Arbatov, "Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 10. (1988), pp. 75-87; Arbatov, "How much defence is enough," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 4 (1989), pp. 31-44. On strategic arms and SDI, see A.A. Vasil'ev, M. I. Gerasev & A. A. Kokoshin, "Asimmetrichnyy Otvet (vozmozhnye mery protivodeystviya SOI)," *SShA*, no. 2, (1987), pp. 26-35. For a slightly more conservative proposal, see Genrikh Trofimenko, "Novoe real'nost i novoe myslenie," *SShA*, no. 2, (1987), pp. 3-25. An article reflecting an understanding of Western nuclear deterrence theory is Daniil Proektor, "Politics, Clausewitz and victory in a nuclear war," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 5 (1988), pp. 74-80.

⁶⁰ The lack of consensus over what exactly constituted "defensiveness" was institutionalized in the last doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, which stated the non-offensive principles on the political side, but continued to stick to the idea of a "crushing repulse" (sokrushitel'nyy otpor), i.e. a strategic counteroffensive, on the military-technical side. "Appendix F: Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine," in Scott & Scott, op. cit., pp. 285-288.

⁶¹ See e.g. Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Security*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 420-422.

⁶² See the above-mentioned collective editorial in *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 1 (1988). For the Navy CinC's critique of the US maritime strategy, see V. Chernavin, "Gotov' sebya k sovremennomu boyu," *Morskoi Sbornik*, no. 1 (1989), pp. 3-8. See also Yuri Lilin, "VMS SshA: Starye postulaty 'novoy' morskoy strategii," *Morskoi Sbornik*, no. 2 (1989), pp. 65-70. In these articles the maritime strategy is described as "destabilizing" and "threatening". (Similar ideas are applied to the Finnish context in Yuri Deryabin's [alias Yuri Komissarov] 1988 article "USSR-Finland: A New Quality of Peaceful Coexistence," *International Affairs* [Moscow], no. 1[1988] pp. 77-85). For (former) Defence Minister Yazov's critique of NATO's motives, see Dmitry Yazov, "Na nachalakh realizma i balansa interesov," *Pravda*, February 9, 1989 (cited in Kokoshin, op. cit., p. 142). See also, G. I. Salmanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Some Views on the Nature of War in Defense of Socialism," in *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art...(Vol. II)*, pp. 310-323. (Originally published in *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1988).

⁶³ Meyer, op. cit.

⁶⁴ Snel, op. cit., 217-218

⁶⁵ Snel, op. cit., p. 227.

⁶⁶ "O voennoi doktrine SSSR [Proekt]," *Voyennaya Mysl' - spetsial'nyi vypusk*, 1990, p. 27. The citation is from Snel, p. 226, since I have not been able to locate the *Voyennaya Mysl'* special supplement from Finnish libraries. It is, however, worth noting the this draft pays at least lip service to Gorbachev's views about war being an outdated and unacceptable way of solving conflicts. Dick, 1994, p. 495.

⁶⁷ I. N. Rodionov, "O nekotorykh polozheniyakh sovetskoi voennoi doktriny," *Voyennaya mysl'* no. 3 (1991), p. 7.

⁶⁸ V. L. Manilov, "Voenno-politicheski analiz kontseptsii natsional'noi bezopasnosti SSSR," *Voyennaya mysl'* no. 3 (1991), pp. 45-48. It is noting that Manilov is one of the more liberal members of the Soviet/Russian military elite.

⁶⁹ B.N. Ponikarovskiy & A.M. Mikhaylovskiy, "Zametki po proekty voennoy reformy v SSSR," *Voyennaya mysl'* no. 5 (1991), p. 23.

⁷⁰ I. N. Vorob'ev, "Printsipy formirovaniya voennoy doktriny," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 11-12 (1991), p. 22-29.

⁷¹ This was pointed out even by the discussants themselves, often coupled with a critique about the military-technical vagueness of the doctrine. See e.g. Vorob'ev, op. cit.; Ponikarovskiy & Mikhaylovskiy, op. cit. An early formulation of the threat perception (the U.S. seeking for geopolitical hegemony and military-technical superiority over other great powers) that would emerge and consolidate later is C. A. Tyushkevich, "Marksistsko-leninskoe uchenie o voyne i armii: istoriya razvitiya i sovremennye otsenki," *Voyennaya mysl'* no. 6 (1991), especially p. 52.

⁷² A. A. Danilovich & Yu. P. Tikhomirov, "Natsional'nia voennie doktrini stran SNG: nekotorye podkhody i otdel'nye polozhenio," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 2 (1993).

⁷³ A. A. Danilovich, "On New military Doctrines in Russia and CIS," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* vol. 5, no. 4 (Dec 1992), pp. 517-538.

⁷⁴ James M. Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 5, no. 4 (1993), pp. 156-159.

⁷⁵ Danilovich, op cit., pp. 524-525.

⁷⁶ "Osnovy voennoy doktriny Rossii (proekt)," *Voyennaya mysl'* 5/1992 (supplement), s. 3-9.

⁷⁷ I will not engage in a thorough comparison of the 1992 and 1993 documents, since this has already been conducted elsewhere. Charles Dick: "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6/1994 (Special report no. 1), pp. 1-5.

⁷⁸ "Osnovy," p. 3. The concept of multipolarity itself is not mentioned or developed in the 1992 draft.

⁷⁹ While there was some debate over whether the reference really meant the US and NATO (see Dick, op. cit., p. 1; Glanz, op. cit., p. 471), the last seven years of Russian debate over threat perceptions make it quite clear that it is indeed NATO and especially the US that the Russian military command sees as the main threat to the stability of the multipolar world.

⁸⁰ Op. cit., p. 9.

⁸¹ The most thorough analysis of the development of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation is Boris Meissner: "Die Beiden Grundlinien der Aussenpolitik Russlands," *Österreichische Osthefte*, 1/1994, pp. 5-36.

⁸² A draft of the concept was presented to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma in October 1992 (a previous draft already in February of the same year) and published in

January 1993. “Kontsepsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii”, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, 1-2/1993 (supplement). In practice, the Security Council had already rejected the draft before it was published.

⁸³ Op. cit., p. 1.

⁸⁴ Op. cit., p. 2. The intervention in Tadjikistan (formally under the CIS collective security and peacekeeping agreements) began in December 1992. At the time, some of the former *mezhdunarodniki* argued that such entanglements were a liability and unnecessary burden to the new Russia.

⁸⁵ Op. cit., p. 3, 11-13.

⁸⁶ Op.cit., p. 8.

⁸⁷ Cited in Dimitri Simes, “The Results of 1997: No Dramatic Upheavals,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1998, p. 28.

⁸⁸ “Strategiya dlya Rossii. Tezisy Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 19.8.1992.

⁸⁹ Dick, op. cit., p. 3; Andrei Kosyrev: “Wir lassen uns allein von russischen Interessen leiten.” *Osteuropa-Archiv* (Juli 1994), p. A354.

⁹⁰ Arbatov has pointed out that the liberal internationalists dominated Russian foreign policy this brief period only in the fields of arms control, regional problems, the UN and the OSCE. Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 10.

⁹¹ Vladislav Chernov, “Natsional’nye interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlya ee bezopasnosti”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 29.4.1993; Dmitri Kosyrev, “Prioritety gosudarstva na mezhdunarodnoy arene”, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* 29.4.1993. Both Chernov and Oleg Osobkov (who is interviewed in Kosyrev’s article) worked in the Security Council at the time when the articles were published. Both articles provide a list of the institutions that participated in the formulation of the concept. The Ministry of Defence is among them, the General Staff is not.

⁹² Osobkov actually mentions the concept of “multipolarity” (not “multicentrism”) in this context. No reservations towards Russia’s role as one of the poles is expressed either by Chernov or Osobkov. This is a significant departure from the Foreign Ministry’s draft concept. However, the aim of integrating into Western Europe is still presented side by side with ideas of multipolar balancing.

⁹³ “Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, *Krasnaya Zvezda* 19.11.1993, pp. 3-8. The published version is a “summary” of 21 pages of the 23-page doctrine.

⁹⁴ Op. cit., p. 7.

⁹⁵ The exact formulation can be found on op. cit., p 3. According to Klimenko and Kolyukov, some experts advocated an even wider definition of the deeds which would

justify the first use of nuclear weapons. Klimentko and Koltyukov: “Osnovnoi dokument...”.

⁹⁶ On the complex system of concepts, doctrines, laws, plans, prognoses, programs and official speeches which (supposedly) guides the making of Russian security policy, see V. M. Barynkin, “Planirovanie voennogo stroitel'stva: opyt i sovremennost',” *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 3 (1995), p. 14-16.

⁹⁷ It should be pointed out that there were several hardliners also in (or close to) the Kremlin (e.g. people working in the staff of the Security Council or the semi-official Russian Institute for Strategic Studies) and several (former) liberals in the opposition (e.g. analysts at the Moscow Public Science Foundation). The former often expressed anti-Western ideas similar to those advocated by the opposition while the latter mostly sided with the realists for tactical reasons.

⁹⁸ The following deals mainly with the views of Gennadi Zyuganov and RAU-Corporation. The RAU Corporation, headed by Alexei Podberezhkin and financed by the Spiritual Heritage Foundation, is a semi-official think-tank of the Communists. It is worth noting that the national-patriotic opposition includes also more extreme figures such as Valdimir Zhirinovskiy or Alexandr Dugin. The latter has - among other things - made the case for placing Eurasian border guards on the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders. See Alexandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (Moskva: Arktogeya tsentr, 1999), pp. 316-318.

⁹⁹ Gennady Zyuganov, *Geografiya Pobedy: Osnovy Rossiyskoy Geopolitiki*, (Moskva: S.N., 1997), pp. 14-16. 45-52.

¹⁰⁰ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 168-183, 195-204. *Rossiya - Rodina moya...*, pp. 346-350.

¹⁰¹ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 151.

¹⁰² *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 156-159.

¹⁰³ Gennady Zyuganov, *Rossiya - Rodina moya: ideologiya gosudarstvennogo patriotizma* (Moskva: Informpechat', 1996), pp. 171-173; See also Sergei Kortunov, “Natsional'naya Sverkhzadacha: Opyt Rossiyskoy ideologii,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7. 10. 1995; Sergei Kortunov, “Rossiya: Natsional'naya identichnost na rubezhe Vekov,” *Nauchnye Doklady 37* (Moskva: Moskovskiy Obshchestvennyy Nauchnyy Fond, 1997), esp. p. 56. Kortunov worked in the Security Council as part of the team preparing the Russian National Security Concept.

¹⁰⁴ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 239. Zyuganov also cites Tikhomirov, who claims that unipolarity is “unnatural” as such. Vladislav Tikhomirov, “Global'noe supryzhestvo: razumnoe edinstvo protivopolozhnostey v mirovoy sisteme gosudarstv,” *POLIS*, no. 2 (1997), pp. 53-55.

¹⁰⁵ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 234-244. Zyuganov relies mainly on the work of Konstantin Sorokin, who has written a series of theoretical articles on polarity. Konstantin Sorokin, “Rossiya i mnogopolyarnost': vremya obnimat', i vremya uklonyat'sya ot obyatiy,” *POLIS*, no. 1 (1994), pp. 7-32; A straight-forward critique of unipolarity can be found in Konstantin Sorokin, “Kto pro chto, a amerikantsy pro unipolyarnost',” *POLIS*, no. 2 (1997), pp. 45-49.

See also Konstantin Sorokin, "Rossiya i igra geopoliticheskikh interesov v areale velikogo okeana," *POLIS*, no. 4 (1994), pp. 5-28; Konstantin Sorokin, "Geopolitika Rossii v 'blizhnem' i 'srednem' zarubezhe: prakseologicheskie izmereniya," *POLIS*, no. 3 (1995), pp. 2-39; Konstantin Sorokin, "Yadernoe oruzhie v epokhu geopoliticheskoy mnogopolyarnosti," *POLIS*, no. 4 (1995), pp. 18-32.

¹⁰⁶ Sorokin, "Rossiya i mnogopolyarnost'...", p. 26; *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 242. (The English translation is Sorokin's own.) According to the RAU doctrine, strategic stability refers to a situation where no country is seeking to change the status quo. *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii (problemy i priority)* (Moskva: RAU-Korporatsiya, 1994), 325. (Alexei Podberezkin headed the editorial collegium).

¹⁰⁷ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 146-147; *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii*, pp. 227-228.. Zyuganov also cites Sergei Kortunov on this issue. Sergei Kortunov, "Rossiya ishchet soyuznikov," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, no. 5 (1995), pp. 17-30.

¹⁰⁸ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 19-23. According to Zyuganov, Jean Bodin claimed that northern cultures develop people who are physically stronger and more warlike, producing great military leaders, while in the south people are more talented in arts, philosophy and mathematics. (!) Op. cit, p. 21.

¹⁰⁹ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 202-203.

¹¹⁰ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 146.

¹¹¹ *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 139. Besides military control, Zyuganov mentions eight different forms of geopolitical control ranging from ideological and cultural control to control over resources and the "ecological situation". Op. cit, pp. 154, 159, 256-258.

¹¹² *Geografiya Pobedy...*, pp. 139-145; *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii*, pp. 235-241. The RAU strategy report mentions explicitly the diminishing of Russia's role of as a naval power as one of the consequences of Nato's enlargement. According to the report, the Baltic Fleet has lost its freedom of manoeuvre and been locked to St. Petersburg because of Nato's increasing presence in the Baltic Sea. Op. cit., p. 236. The same formulation can be found in the RAU-corporation's 1997 paper on military reform. *Voennaya reforma: otsenka ugroz natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossii* (Moskva: RAU-Universitet, 1997), pp. 32-33. (The report identifies Gennady Zyuganov as the editor-in-chief, and Yuri Lebedev, Alexei Podberezkin, and Anton Surikov as members of the editorial collegium).

¹¹³ *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii...*, p. 341.

¹¹⁴ *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii...*, p. 345. Compared to the official doctrine, the RAU-doctrine places more emphasis on the role conventional forces in protecting Russia's security. *Natsional'naya doktrina Rossii...*, pp. 355-364.

¹¹⁵ Gennady Zyuganov, *G. A. Zyuganov i o G. A. Zyuganove* (Perm': S.N., 1995), pp. 103-115. Zyuganov, *Veryu v Rossiyu* (Voronezh, 1995), p. 83. *Geografiya Pobedy...*, p. 240. The formulation is thus identical to the old thinkers' 1980's formulation of reasonable sufficiency being dependent on Western capabilities.

¹¹⁶ For a realist critique of the basic assumptions of civilizational determinism, see E.B.

Rashkovskiy, "Novaya versiya determinizma versus tsivilizatsionnaya real'nost," in "Tsivilizatsionnaya model' mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i ee implikatsii (nauchnaya diskussiya v redaktsii 'Polisa'," *POLIS* 5/1995, pp. 131-134.

¹¹⁷ Rogov, "Yadernoe oruzhie..." , p. 14. Rogov is director of the Institute of US and Canada Studies.

¹¹⁸ Sergei Rogov, "Evraziyskiy proekt Rossii: Novye izmereniya Russkoy idei," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29.8.1996, pp. 6-7.

¹¹⁹ Sergei Rogov, "Rossiya i SShA v mnogopolyarnom mire," *SShA* no. 10 (1992), esp., p. 6-7. Rogov's argument is almost identical to the one made by John Mearsheimer. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1990).

¹²⁰ There have been several ambitious attempts to formulate methods for "rationalist" threat analysis. See e.g. A.B. Logunov, S.L. Lechurov, "Kontseptual'nye osnovy vyyavleniya i neytralizatsii ugroz bezopasnosti rossiyskoy federatsii v oboronnoy sfere," *Voennaya mysl'* 3/1998, pp. 13-19; V.S. Pirumov, "Methodological Aspects in the research of Russia's National Security Problems under Contemporary Conditions, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 367-382; Valeri Manilov, "Natsional'naya bezopasnost': tsennosti, interesy, i tseli," *Voennaya mysl'* no. 6, 1995, pp. 29-40; Valeri Manilov, "Issledovanie problem natsional'noy bezopasnosti: voprosy metodologii," *Voennaya mysl'* no. 5, 1995, pp. 9-18. Manilov is the principal writer of the new Russian military doctrine. He is a somewhat ambiguous realist since he speaks about values (such "spiritualness" and "collectivism") as the highest-ranking component in the "triad" of national values, interests and goals. However, Manilov's analysis about Russia's national interests and goals seems like a text-book application of realism, and it shows no trace of messianistic or ideological influence.

¹²¹ For a good formulation, see Tatayana Alekseeva, "Ratsional'nyy egoizm natsional'nogo interesa," in "Natsionalnyy interes (zaochnyy kruglyy stol)," *POLIS* 1/1995, pp. 92-96.

¹²² See e.g. "Iz Poslaniya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii Federalnomu Sobraniyu," *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* 4/1999, pp. 3-7.

¹²³ See e.g. Sergei Rogov, "Rossiya i SShA v mnogopolyarnom mire," *SShA* no. 10 (1992), pp. 3-14; Sergei Rogov, "Yadernoe oruzhie v mnogopolyarnom mire," *SShA* no. 8 (1998), pp. 3-18; Nikolai Sokov, "Mnogopolyarnyy mir v zerkale teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy," *SShA* no. 8 (1998), pp. 19-31. An accessible introduction into the Russian discourse concerning multipolarity can be found in the roundtable discussion "Is the world becoming multipolar?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 1-20.

¹²⁴ Vitali Tsygichko & Rainer Huber, Strategicheskaya stabil'nost v mnogopolyarnoy mezhdunarodnoy sisteme: dva podkhoda k ee otsenke, *Voennaya mysl'* no. 1, 1998, p. 23. (This is Tsygichko's view. The other author, Rainer Huber is German).

¹²⁵ The realist rationale for the Nato-Russian Council is best summarized in "Rossiya i Nato: Tezisy Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 21.6.1995. See also Sokov, "Mnogopolyarnyy mir..." , p. 29.

¹²⁶ “Strategiya dlya Rossii 2. Tezisy Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 27.5.1994; “Vozrodit'sya li soyuz? Tezisy Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 23.5.1996; Vasili Krivokhizha, “Rossiya v novoi strukture mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy: nabroski k kontseptsii natsional'noi bezopasnosti,” *POLIS*, 3/1995, pp. 9-22. Krivokhizha, who is assistant director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, draws interesting parallels between Western and Russian realism with respect to the multipolarity/spheres-of-interest topic.

¹²⁷ Vadim Lukov, “Russia’s security challenges,” *International Affairs*, no. 1, 1997, p. 16.

¹²⁸ Sokov, “Mnogopolyarnyy mir...”, p. 28.

¹²⁹ See e.g. “Strategia Rossii v XXI veke: Analiz situatsii i nekotorye predlozheniya (strategiya-3): Tezisy Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 19.6.1998. See especially part 3.13. It is worth noting that CFDP’s policy prescriptions regarding multipolar balancing are rather similar than what can be found in the new (2000) National Security Concept, even though the CFDP Strategy-3 is a pre-Kosovo one.

¹³⁰ “Kontseptsiya Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, 2/1998, pp. 3-18. See also Henrikki Heikka, “The Evolution of Russian Grand Strategy and Its Implications on Finnish Security,” *Northern Dimensions*, 1999, pp. 27-44.

¹³¹ Anatoli Klimenko & Aleksandr Kol'tyukov: “Osnovnoi dokument voennogo stroitel'stva”, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* 19.2.1998.

¹³² Leonid Mayorov, then assistant secretary of the Security Council, emphasized the role of the multipolarity paradigm as the conceptual basis of the 1997 Concept. Leonid Mayorov, “Priority kontseptsii natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiii,” *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 10/1997, p. 21.

¹³³ *Kontseptsiya Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/1999-11-26/1_cons1.html

¹³⁴ Since the military doctrine had not been ratified by the time this report was finished, the following analysis draws on the draft (Oct. 1999) doctrine. *Voennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (proekt)*. Available from the internet in the following address:
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/1999-10-23/rus_doctrina_1.html

¹³⁵ *Kontseptsiya Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2000-01-14/6_concept.html

¹³⁶ It is worth pointing out that the ratified (2000) version of the National Security Concept closely resembles the 1999 draft version of the Concept, which in turn had been in the making for almost a year before publication. The paradigm of the doctrines is therefore a “pre-Putin” one and does not reflect the change from the Yeltsin era. There has, however been some polemic over the differences of emphasis in the Concept and the Military Doctrine. Solovyev, for example, makes much out of the fact that the order of threat perceptions is different in the drafts of the military doctrine and national security concepts. See Vadim Solov'ev, “Osnovopolagayushchie dokumenty po natsional'noi bezopasnosti ne

obrazuyut edinogo paketa,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No 46 (169), 26.11.-3.12.1999, p.1. What Solov’ev does not see is that the underlying paradigm in both doctrines is identical. As long as American unipolar ambitions are seen as a source of regional instability (as they are in both doctrines), it is rather insignificant whether regional or great power conflicts are seen as the main source of threat to Russia. The idea that interventions by the unipolar power destabilizes the international system make regional and global threats interdependent in most cases.

¹³⁷ Here we can see the same hypocritical logic as in the 1997 Concept: Russia wants international security to be based on a normative framework, such as the OSCE code of conduct, which it has broken more often than any other country. (See Stephen Blank, “The Code and Civil-Military Relations: The Russian Case,” in Gert de Nooy (ed.): *Cooperative Security, the OSCE, and its Code of Conduct* [The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 1996], pp. 93-112.) It thus seems that Moscow is still completely blind to the blows that it has inflicted to the normative framework of European security through its own policies.

¹³⁸ That few politicians in Western capitals seem to be willing to get their countries engaged in the Balkans unless absolutely necessary (as testified in the prolonged discussions before deciding to do something about Serbia’s ethnic cleansing campaign.), seems to have gone unnoticed by Russians. For a most entertaining version of Washington’s presumed ambitions, see Aleksandr Matveyev, “Washington’s Claims...,” pp. 53-65. Matveyev is senior adviser to the permanent representative of Russia in the OSCE.

¹³⁹ See Heikka, “The Evolution of Russian Grand Strategy,” p. 28.

¹⁴⁰ The logic here bears some similarities to the way in which military hardliners tried to preserve an offensive posture during perestroika as well as the way in which Zyuganov defines his preference for Russia’s military posture (see earlier). The new Concept differs from these in that the presumed offensive intentions of the enemy are now understood as being targeted on peripheral areas (the Balkans, the Caucasus, etc.) instead of Russia proper.

¹⁴¹ This downgrading is reflected clearly in the belief that a new arms race among great powers lies ahead. If there is any point where one can find a fundamental difference between the draft 1999 and official 2000 version of the Concept, it is in the sphere of arms control. The draft includes a reference to “preserving and reinforcing the ABM treaty”, and “renewing or concluding new legally binding agreements on arms limitation” (the latter probably referring to strategic arms limitation). In the official version these have been dropped out and references to a qualitatively new arms race as well as the need to adapt existing arms control agreements to new circumstances have been included.

¹⁴² For a devastating critique of the nuclear doctrine’s vagueness see, Anatoli Novikov, “Poverkhno...”, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No...

¹⁴³ That the National Security Concept was originally in 1991 meant to be an update to the Soviet “Programme for a Nuclear Free World” (1986) tells just how far we have come from the post-cold war euphoria. Boris Pyadyshev, “We Need a National Security Concept,” *International Affairs*, no. 4, 1991, pp. 173-175.

¹⁴⁴ Mikhail Motsak, “S Pritselom na nepryamyie strategicheskie deistviya” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 3 (176), 28.1.-3.2.2000, p. 4.

¹⁴⁵ “General’nyi kurs v mirovom okeane,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* , No. 45 (168), 19-25.11.1999, pp. 1, 4.

¹⁴⁶ Alexey Muraviev, “Second Wind for the Russian Kirov Class,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 20-22.

¹⁴⁷ The underestimation of economic power and statecraft is well reflected in Matveyev’s article: “Like many centuries ago, force is again the only criterion of importance of states and their spiritual values.” Matveyev, “Washington’s Claims...”, p. 53. Interestingly, Matveyev fails to provide any theory about America’s aggressive motivations.

¹⁴⁸ In the Concept, such propaganda is evident in the way internal threats are explained by external ones. Apart from the familiar references to the activities of foreign intelligence agencies in Russia there is also an interesting reference to “the spread of economic, demographic, cultural, and religious expansion from contiguous states into Russian territory”. The Concept states that “the state policy should also counter the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries”. This stands in dark contrast to popular Eurasianist assumptions about the unusual tolerance of Russians and their historical role in “integrating” neighbouring cultures to Russia. See Henrikki Heikka, “Beyond Neorealism and Constructivism: Desire, Identity and Russian Foreign Policy,” in Ted Hopf, *Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), esp. pp. 96-99.)

¹⁴⁹ Just how far Russia has come from the initial post-cold war euphoria, can be seen when these pessimistic conclusions are compared to the title of the 1991 lead article in the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s journal *International Affairs*. The article was written by Jhoon Rhee, the Tae Kwon Do marshal art world champion. Jhoon Rhee, “A New Age Ideology - Happyism,” *International Affairs*, 2/1991, pp. 3-11.